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software as a service model
Jaakko Nurkka
Technische Universität München
Abstract
Servitization is transforming traditional manufacturing and product-oriented firms across industries in many ways. One of
these transformations concerns the business models of firms that transform from selling products to provisioning products as a
service with product-service systems (PSS). I analyze this form of servitization in the software industry, where the software as
a service business model is becoming the standard for most start-ups as well as some big enterprises like Adobe and Autodesk.
Event study methodology is applied to 359 software vendors’ announcements of new software as a service offerings between
2001 and 2015, analyzing how installed base, parallel business models and partnerships with external service providers
influence the reaction in the stock price of the software vendors. I find that “as-a- service” business models are not perceived
as a substitute but rather as a complement for perpetual product sales and that collaboration with specialized service providers
for the delivery of the new offering is rewarded by the stock market. I explain the findings with organizational inertia within the
software vendors’ organization as well as that of their customers. The findings are used to discuss how companies can manage
the inertia by developing new product lines for the PSS model, offering perpetual product sales in parallel and cooperating
with third party service providers for the service delivery.
Keywords: SaaS, Software-as-a-Service, Servitization, Business model transformation, Stock markets
1. Introduction
Since the beginning of industrialization, services have
grown from a residual category for anything that is not agri-
culture or manufacturing to being the sector driving growth
in most industrialized economies (Chesbrough and Spohrer
(2006)). The growing importance of services is not just a
phenomenon observed in macroeconomics, but it is dras-
tically changing the way businesses work. It appears that
Levitt (1972) controversial statement that everyone is in the
business of services was indeed correct, as services have be-
come something that every company has to master. Take
IBM, a former leader in computer manufacturing, as an ex-
ample. The company now receives one third of its revenues
from its Global Business Services, division that did not even
exist before the 1990s (Chesbrough and Spohrer (2006);
International Business Machines Corp. (2015)). The phe-
nomenon in question, which has transformed manufacturing
companies like IBM into service businesses, is often referred
to as servitization in the academic dialogue (Gebauer and
Friedli (2005); Gebauer et al. (2012); Kastalli and Van Looy
(2013); Mathieu (2001b); Oliva and Kallenberg (2003);
Suarez et al. (2013)). It stands for the process of com-
panies moving towards services along the product-service
continuum (Oliva and Kallenberg (2003)), with the relative
importance of services increasing for their business. Many
academics explain the phenomenon with the financial, strate-
gic and marketing opportunities that services offer (Baines
et al. (2009)).
However prominent services are becoming to businesses
of all types, some empirical studies have raised doubts about
the profit effects of servitization to providers (Fang et al.
(2008); Neely (2008); Visnjic et al. (2012)). These stud-
ies have shown that increasing degree of servitization of a
company’s business does not necessarily lead to an increase
in profits, rather the opposite. Scholars often refer to this as
the servitization paradox, which they explain with the diffi-
culties organizations face in adapting to the different ways
in which service business is conducted compared to product
business. At the same time, scholars also note that even if
servitization may reduce the profitability of companies, they
often cannot afford not to move towards services and that
servitization represents a prerequisite for growth (Fang et al.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5282/jums/v3i2pp121-150
J. Nurkka / Junior Management Science 3(2) (2018) 121-150122
(2008); Visnjic et al. (2012)). This begs the question whether
servitization should be approached proactively at all.
Servitization of product-oriented companies can take
many forms beyond adding services that are offered comple-
mentarily to the main product, with some companies even
discontinuing selling their product to customers and only
offering it as a part of a service (Cusumano et al. (2015);
Johnson et al. (2008); Rapaccini and Visintin (2014); Ulaga
and Reinartz (2011)). Such business models have gathered a
lot of hype around themselves1 and have started transforma-
tions in industries like the pre-packaged software industry.
These offerings have been labelled as product-service systems
(PSS) in the academic dialogue (Beuren et al. (2013)). Nev-
ertheless, many companies have remained cautious about
disrupting their business model with such PSS offerings.
To date, academic research has been unable to help these
companies in their decision-making as existing empirical
research has either generalized servitization to cover any
form of movement towards service-based revenue (Fang
et al. (2008); Kastalli and Van Looy (2013); Neely (2008))
or recognized PSS offerings as products rather than services
(Suarez et al. (2013)). This is testament to the fact that exist-
ing empirical research has exclusively observed servitization
as a company level phenomenon.
This is why I propose a product-level analysis that focuses
on the transformation in product business models from prod-
uct sales to offering product as a service, or PSS. In order to
observe the product-level change, I employ an event study
that measures how the investors of publicly traded companies
react to announcements that imply a transformation from
selling products to provisioning them as a PSS. I then corre-
late the market reaction to variables about how the company
manages the transformation, while controlling for environ-
mental influences. Consequently, I am looking to answer the
following research question:
“What determines, from the perspective of in-
vestors, whether the introduction of a product-
service system offering will lead to value cre-
ation?”
The event study is conducted in the software industry,
which has seen the rise of the software as a service (SaaS)
business model that embodies the transformation from sell-
ing products to provisioning them as a PSS. The software in-
dustry fits the purposes of this study well, because the cloud
computing framework (Armbrust et al. (2010)) has acceler-
ated servitization in the industry, making sure that there are
enough events to draw from.
1Perhaps the most prominent example is Rolls-Royce’s „Power By The
Hour“, a model where their customers pay for the use of the jet engine by
the hour, with its maintenance, reparations, and upgrades all included in the
price (Davies et al. (2006)). Other well-known examples include telecom
contracts, where network providers like AT&T combine the mobile phone,
the usage of the network as well as phone upgrades to a single subscription
service (AT&T Inc. (2016)), and car-sharing services like BMW DriveNow,
where car manufacturers combine the car, insurance, taxes, parking, gaso-
line and maintenance to a single pay per use service (DriveNow UK Ltd.
(2016)).
This thesis is divided into five chapters. The second chap-
ter following this introduction discusses the existing litera-
ture about the SaaS business model and servitization. Based
on the discussion, I derive three hypotheses to be tested in the
study at the end of the chapter. The third chapter explains
the event study methodology used to measure how the stock
markets react to the introduction of a SaaS offering, while
the fourth chapter discusses the results of the study in detail.
Finally, the fifth chapter discusses the results as well as their
implications to both academics and practitioners. Addition-
ally, the limitations of the study and propositions for further
research to be conducted in the field are discussed.
2. Literature review and hypotheses
In this chapter, I review existing literature on (1) the soft-
ware as a service business model and (2) the phenomena of
servitization and product-service systems (PSS). The main
goal of the first two subsections of the chapter is to under-
stand what the benefits and challenges of servitization are
and how the SaaS model embodies the phenomenon. Based
on this, I then move on to the third subsection, which intro-
duces three decisions that firms need to take when introduc-
ing new PSS offerings and how these are likely to influence
the value-creation potential of the firm. As a result, three hy-
potheses to be tested in this study are introduced as a result
of this chapter.
2.1. Software as a service
Software as a service (SaaS) describes a concept of soft-
ware delivery that differentiates itself from the traditional
perpetual licensing model of software business in two ways.
First, in the SaaS model, customers access the software ap-
plications over the internet and do not own the software or
the hardware needed to run it (Armbrust et al. (2010)). Sec-
ond, the customers only pay for the usage of the software
(pay-per-use) or the value gained by using the software (pay-
per-value) and do not purchase licenses upfront from the
software vendor (Sääksjärvi et al. (2005)). These two dis-
tinct characteristics are also why, from a broader perspective,
the software as a service model embodies servitization in the
software industry (Sultan (2014)). No longer is the under-
lying software product the most important unit of exchange,
but rather the value-in-use provided to the customers (Baines
et al. (2009); Vargo and Lusch (2008a)).
Models of software delivery as an on-demand service
have been developed since the late 1990s, with Applica-
tion Service Provisioning (ASP) model being the most well-
recognized of the old terminology (Benlian and Hess (2011);
Sääksjärvi et al. (2005)). These models never really man-
aged to reach the attention of mainstream audiences, and it
took considerable technological advances through the Cloud
Computing concept and Multi-tenant architectures to really
kick off the delivery of software as an on-demand service
(Benlian and Hess (2011); Sääksjärvi et al. (2005); Stucken-
berg et al. (2014)).
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Multi-tenant architectures allow multiple customers to
use the same instance of an application on the same in-
frastructure (Aulbach et al. (2008)), making the applica-
tions truly scalable and thus optimizing resource utilization.
Similarly optimizing the utilization of resources, the Cloud
Computing concept separates software delivery into isolated
layers as presented in Figure 1 (Youseff et al. (2008)). This
makes the development, deployment and provisioning of
software more efficient than in previous models like ASP
(Armbrust et al. (2010); Benlian and Hess (2011)).
Even though these technological advances have certainly
been important for the breakthrough of service-based soft-
ware delivery models, from a business model perspective the
new software as a service concept is not different to its pre-
decessors. The underlying concept of the models is that ser-
vices necessary for using software like installation, operation
and maintenance are provided by the software vendor in one
recurring fee model (Ma (2007); Sääksjärvi et al. (2005)).
From a pragmatic perspective, this merely means that the
software vendor takes over these additional services from
the IT department of the customer, like illustrated in Figure
2. This makes sense from a resource optimization point-of-
view, because this way the software vendor can benefit from
economies of scale in operating the software and let the cus-
tomer focus resources on its core business processes.
This study focuses on the servitization character of the
SaaS model as well as the business model implications of the
downstream integration of software firms. I thus only an-
alyze the service-based business model of provisioning soft-
ware as a service, where the underlying focus is on value-
in-use of software products and where the software products
are provisioned as part of a service instead of being sold to
the customer. This is why this study treats all stages of provi-
sioning software as a service, whether multi-tenant or single-
tenant, ASP or modern SaaS, as equal.
2.2. Servitization, service-dominant logic and product-
service systems
The word servitization is often traced back to Vander-
merwe and Rada (1988) in scientific literature, but as
Schmenner (2009) argues, the antecedents of the phe-
nomenon stretch back all the way back to the second half of
the 19th century, when manufacturers started to integrate
vertically towards services. Initially, the most common step of
servitization was to take control of services like distribution
along the supply chain as companies were looking to gain
control over the value chain and become less dependent
on market actors (Schmenner (2009)). Initial definitions
of servitization reflected this vertical integration nature, but
more recent inquiry and integration of related research fields
like the product-service systems (PSS) literature has led to
a broader definition of servitization that also encompasses
the integration of products and services in combinations that
deliver value-in-use (Baines et al. (2009)).
Interest towards servitization as a phenomenon has been
growing in the 21st century, not least in the field of manufac-
turing (Baines et al. (2009); Kastalli and Van Looy (2013);
Neely (2008); Neely et al. (2011)). The growing importance
of services for business and society has even lead to lead-
ing researchers calling for a new research discipline for ser-
vice science (Chesbrough and Spohrer (2006)). The interest
has also caught up on the software industry and information
systems research in recent years (Benlian and Hess (2011);
Komssi et al. (2009); Sääksjärvi et al. (2005); Stuckenberg
et al. (2011); Xin and Levina (2008)).
Servitization can take many forms, depending on how
the company wants to position its offering on the product-
service continuum (Oliva and Kallenberg (2003)). Initial def-
initions of servitization defined the phenomenon as the addi-
tion of services to support the product in the core of the of-
fering (Baines et al. (2009)). However, more recent research
has identified another form of servitization where companies
move from offering products and services to offering inte-
grated solutions or product-service systems (PSS)2 (Baines
et al. (2007); Cusumano et al. (2015); Tukker (2004); Tukker
and Tischner (2006)).
This is in line with the dominant logic distinction pro-
posed by Vargo and Lusch (2004) in the marketing literature.
They argue that there are two types of outputs produced by
companies: (1) goods accompanied with services that sup-
port the goods as well as (2) services. The former represents
what they call the goods-dominant logic (G-D), whereas the
latter describes the service-dominant logic (S-D). Although
some argue that this distinction is difficult to apply in practice
(Sultan (2014)), it provides a method for distinguishing be-
tween the two stages of servitization. In the G-D logic, goods
and services are units of output and the good is the focal point
of exchange, whereas the S-D logic understands the service
provision as the fundament of exchange with goods repre-
senting a mere part of the process of value co-creation (Lusch
and Vargo (2006); Vargo and Lusch (2004), Vargo and Lusch
(2008a), Vargo and Lusch (2008b)). Thus, servitization in
the G-D logic would imply the addition of new services (see
the initial definitions of servitization in e.g. Vandermerwe
and Rada (1988)) to create extra value to the customers of a
product. However, servitization could also be seen as a trans-
formation from the G-D logic to the S-D logic, with the com-
pany switching the fundament of exchange from a product
to a service.
Based on this distinction between the two stages of servi-
tization, transforming to the software as a service (or more
generally PSS) business model would represent the second
stage. Software vendors have traditionally sold software
licenses and provisioned maintenance and other services
as additional offerings. The software as a service business
model changes the fundament of exchange as the underlying
software product becomes a mere part of a value creation
process.
The underlying reason to become service-dominant and
2To be precise, there are three stages of product-service systems, product-
oriented, use-oriented and result- oriented PSS, based on what the focus of
the offering is (Tukker (2004)). For simplification, however, I focus on the
more advanced use and result-oriented PSS types in this thesis.
J. Nurkka / Junior Management Science 3(2) (2018) 121-150124
Figure 1: Ontology of five layers in Cloud computing (Youseff et al. (2008)).
Figure 2: Difference in on premise and software as a service responsibilities (Stuckenberg et al. (2014)).
move towards PSS resides in the potential of such offerings to
fulfill customer demands better. In a PSS, the customer pays
for using or benefiting from the asset rather than purchas-
ing it, leading to a reorganization of risks, responsibilities
and costs associated with the ownership of the asset (Baines
et al. (2007); Beuren et al. (2013)). This reorganization of
resources also helps providers differentiate themselves from
competition, foster customer relationships, and increase and
balance revenues (Baines et al. (2007), Baines et al. (2009);
Mathieu (2001b); Oliva and Kallenberg (2003)). This indi-
cates that a move to a PSS offering can optimize resource
utilization both for the provider and the customer.
However, the fact that many companies are slow or even
reluctant to move toward PSS indicates that there are some
barriers to their adoption. Indeed, researchers in both the
PSS literature and the more general servitization literature
talk about cultural as well as organizational challenges re-
lated to the adoption (Baines et al. (2007), 2009; Gebauer
et al. (2005); Gebauer and Friedli (2005)). The indication
is that an organization has to overcome inertia (Hannan and
Freeman (1984)) on its way to successfully reaping the ben-
efits of provisioning PSS.
2.2.1. Resource optimization benefits of PSS
Years of research on service management have led to a
widely recognized concept of services that draws on their fun-
damental difference to products. Thus, services are often de-
fined along the characteristics of intangibility, heterogeneity,
simultaneity, perishability and the existence of an external
factor (Stuckenberg et al. (2014)). These underlying char-
acteristics are also the starting point for understanding the
benefits of servitization that have been studied extensively in
the past, both from the perspective of the customer and the
provider (Baines et al. (2009)).
Competitive, financial and marketing benefits are gen-
erally seen as the drivers of servitization for providers
(Baines et al. (2009); Mathieu (2001b); Oliva and Kallenberg
(2003)). From a competitive perspective, services can lead
to a strong competitive advantage as the service experience
is more difficult to copy than physical products (Mathieu
(2001b); Oliva and Kallenberg (2003)). Services can thus
help companies differentiate themselves from their compe-
tition better (Neely (2008)). This is especially important
in industries where products have become or are becoming
commoditized. The case of Hilti in the construction tools
industry that Johnson et al. (2008) present, provides a case
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in point for this argument. The authors explain that the in-
creasing commoditization of construction tools pushed Hilti
to rethink customer value, leading them to offer access to
tools as a service. This meant that the customers did not
have to worry about storage or repairs anymore and could
just enjoy being able to use the tools they needed, whenever
they needed them.
From a financial perspective, services and PSS can help
reduce the fluctuation of revenues as it is often more difficult
for customers to give up on purchasing services than new
products (Mathieu (2001b); Oliva and Kallenberg (2003)).
Additionally, especially in industries with a high installed-
base-to-new-units ratios, services can act as an essential
new way of increasing revenues of a manufacturing com-
pany (Neely (2008); Wise and Baumgartner (1999)). In-
deed, some empirical evidence indicates that servitization
can help companies increase their total revenues (Visnjic
et al. (2012)).
Finally from a marketing perspective, services increase
the intensity and frequency of customer contact and thus
transform the customer relationship from transactional
to continuous (Mathieu (2001b); Oliva and Kallenberg
(2003)). This in turn helps companies lock-in their cus-
tomers and lock-out the competition (Neely (2008)). In
other words, customers of PSS are in a tighter engagement
with the provider and thus more loyal to them (Aurich et al.
(2010)). Consequently, this leads to even more financial ben-
efits as customer lock-in and loyalty reduce the fluctuation
of revenues.
Additionally to these three benefits, a PSS facilitates
speedier and more efficient innovation as the provider is
able to monitor the products and services during their us-
age (Tukker and Tischner (2006)). Kastalli and Van Looy
(2013) similarly propose that increased servitization can
help develop an organization’s innovation capabilities due
to learning effects and increased customer proximity. All the
discussed benefits to providers are summarized in Table 1.
For the customer, a PSS enables focused use of resources
as it reduces the amount of resources tied to investments
as well as administrative and monitoring tasks, meaning
that the customer can ultimately avoid unnecessary costs
and focus resources on core business activities (Baines et al.
(2007)). Additionally, the reorganization of responsibilities
is seen to improve quality (Aurich et al. (2010); Baines et al.
(2007)), which makes sense as the provider can benefit from
economies of scale and scope in delivering the use-value in
a one-to-many model. Specifically, the PSS model allows the
provider to collect data about the use of the service and focus
quality and development efforts on the right functionalities
(Sundin et al. (2009)). Finally, the added flexibility of the
service model allows faster innovation and delivery of new
functionality to customers (Cook et al. (2006); Manzini et al.
(2001)).
2.2.2. Inertia associated with servitization and the servitiza-
tion paradox
The abovementioned benefits of services combined with
increasingly competitive environments in many industries
have lead scholars to urge practitioners to integrate verti-
cally in the value chain by provisioning services (Anderson
and Narus (1995); Wise and Baumgartner (1999)). Indeed,
some authors have since presented compelling evidence
of the benefits (Kastalli and Van Looy (2013); Visnjic and
Van Looy (2009)). However, the evidence has often been
based on case-studies in individual firms.
Managing a service business also has its challenges and
the provider transforming from selling products to provi-
sioning PSS has to overcome inertia (Hannan and Freeman
(1984)) caused by the transformation, both internally and
externally. Indeed, empirical studies on the influence of
servitization on firm performance have yielded mixed re-
sults. Neely (2008) found that initial servitization increases
the profitability of a company, but that the profitability de-
creases with increasing extent of servitization. Furthermore,
Visnjic et al. (2012) took a closer look at the effect of increas-
ing servitization on profitability and market value of firms by
dividing the scope of servitization into its breadth and depth.
They measured the breadth of servitization in the number
of services offered and found out that an increasing breadth
has a negative effect on profits. Service depth, measured
in completeness of service offering, on the other hand, was
found to lead to higher margins and market values.
Meanwhile, studies by Fang et al. (2008) and Suarez et al.
(2013) have indicated that the extent of servitization influ-
ences profitability and firm value negatively only initially.
They show that after reaching a certain percentage of rev-
enue from service sales (20-30% and 50-60% in the two stud-
ies respectively), the effects on profitability and firm value
turn positive. However, the difference in the threshold val-
ues raises questions about the reliability of these results, al-
though the difference might be explained by the fact that
Fang et al. (2008) conducted their study among manufac-
turing firms, whereas Suarez et al. (2013) focused on soft-
ware firms. Nevertheless, there seems to be an argument for
the importance of a certain familiarity with services for firms
looking to become service-oriented.
Most discussed reasons for the servitization paradox in-
clude the cultural and organizational shift required to turn
from developing and selling products to a service provider
(Gebauer et al. (2005); Gebauer and Friedli (2005)) as well
as the challenges in creating and implementing a service-
oriented business model (Gebauer (2009); Gebauer et al.
(2005); Martinez et al. (2010)). Baines et al. (2009) cate-
gorize these challenges of servitization into service strategy,
service design and organizational transformation.
First, organizations need to adopt a service-oriented strat-
egy when transforming to a service provider. Becoming a
service provider implies adopting a downstream position in
the value chain, customer-centricity and service-orientation
(Oliva and Kallenberg (2003); Windahl and Lakemond
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(2006); Wise and Baumgartner (1999)). The challenges
related to these include defining the firm’s strategic position-
ing in the new competitive environment (Oliva and Kallen-
berg (2003)) as well as developing a strategy for generating
the required trust and cooperativeness in their customers
to manage long-term relationships (Wise and Baumgartner
(1999)).
The differential nature of services to products is the rea-
son for the second category of challenges related to servi-
tization: service design. By definition, services are intan-
gible, fuzzy and thus hard to define (Slack (2005)). This
might not only discourage organizational actors from invest-
ing their efforts into developing and expanding the service
offerings (Mathieu (2001b); Oliva and Kallenberg (2003);
Vandermerwe and Rada (1988)), but it might also render ex-
isting capabilities of organizations useless, forcing providers
to acquire and develop new capabilities related to customer
value understanding as well as service design and delivery
(Neely (2008)). All of this adds to the organizational iner-
tia that providers need to overcome within the organization
when transforming to offering PSS. Additionally, providers
need to consider risks related to the design process of PSS,
as taking over activities previously performed by customers
might present additional challenges (Slack (2005)).
Finally, organizations need to adapt necessary organiza-
tional structures, processes and culture. The cultural shift
from transactions, where assets change hands, to a contin-
uous relationship, where customers pay for usage or value,
can be a challenge to organizations (Baines et al. (2009);
Gebauer and Friedli (2005); Rexfelt and Hiort af Ornäs
(2009)). Like Mathieu (Mathieu (2001a); Mathieu (2001b))
notes, the service culture is very distinct to that of a tra-
ditional manufacturing culture, meaning that a shift in the
corporate mind-set is required to prioritize and be successful
in the service business (Oliva and Kallenberg (2003); Slack
(2005)). To achieve a cultural change, organizations need
to significantly alter existing practices and attitudes (Van-
dermerwe and Rada (1988)), leading to an organizational
change process. For example, companies need to transform
their marketing practices and organization from transaction-
oriented to relationship-oriented (Vargo and Lusch (2004)).
Likewise, they need to adapt use-value based sales practices
in the place of traditional feature-based practices (Neely
(2008)). Gebauer et al. (2005)highlighted this in their case
study that showed that traditional sales personnel either gave
away services for free as incentives to purchase the product
or were not at all compelled by the sale of low-value service
contracts in comparison to product sales worth millions of
Euros.
To summarize, PSS have clear benefits to both providers
and customers that stem from the optimization of resource
utilization. However, the transition to provisioning PSS im-
plies challenges to providers that have to do with service de-
sign, organizational transformation and strategy. Companies
need to find strategies for moving towards PSS that maximize
the benefits and minimize the inertia needed to overcome
during the transition.
2.3. Three decisions to be taken when introducing PSS offer-
ing
Moving towards PSS has clear resource optimization ben-
efits both to the providers and their customers that share-
holders should also be able to recognize. However, the transi-
tion to provisioning services creates inertia that the provider
has to overcome on its way to capturing the benefits. I as-
sume that there are three key choices that companies need
to make when introducing PSS and that these influence the
gravity of the resource optimization benefits and the inertia
faced. Based on the theorized effects of the choices, I build
hypotheses about how the stock market is expected to react
to introductions of new SaaS offerings.
2.3.1. Offerings for new product lines versus existing prod-
ucts
The first choice that companies need to make when mov-
ing towards PSS is whether to introduce a PSS for an existing
product or for a new product line. A new product line does
not have an installed base of customers, which can have both
good and bad implications for the provider. An installed base
of customers allows the company to make use of existing re-
sources like customer relationships and product-related re-
sources. However, it is not certain a new PSS offering can
benefit from the resources as existing customers might not
be willing to change to a service-based delivery model of the
product, and the customers to be targeted with the new offer-
ing might be from a completely different segment than cur-
rent customers. In fact, some argue that subscription-based
offerings like software as a service are best targeted to an
audience of smaller businesses that previously were not able
to afford the up-front investment in software licenses (Teece
(2010)). Practitioners often refer to this as the "long-tail"
market, which the SaaS offering helps companies reach. Sim-
ilarly, a PSS offering like BMW DriveNow is clearly targeted
to customers who do not own a personal car and would not
be customers of BMW if not for the DriveNow offering.
Besides an installed base of customers, existing product
lines also benefit from the existing product-related resources
like design and production processes. In software applica-
tions, a SaaS offering could theoretically benefit from the ex-
isting source code and the developers in place to develop the
offering. This would reduce the risk associated with the new
offering as not everything would have to be developed from
scratch. However, software firms often have to rethink their
development processes (Stuckenberg et al. (2014)) and de-
velop a big part of the source code again to be able to create
applications that fit the purpose of a software as a service of-
fering. Thus, it is uncertain to what extent companies can
actually benefit from existing resources when developing the
PSS offering.
On the other hand, an installed base is likely to increase
inertia, as the provider not only has to face resistance in its
own organization but also in its existing customers. First,
the existing product development organizations, processes
and intellectual property can increase inertia, as the service-
oriented offering has to adapt to completely new customer
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expectations and thus the resources need to be revamped
in order to be successful with the PSS offering. The exist-
ing resources could thus prohibit success in the new service-
oriented model, which arguably happened in the case of SAP
Business ByDesign, the story of which is described in one of
the case studies in appendix D.
Second, the existing customers have to change their
mind-set about how products are consumed and acquired,
and in many cases, they also have to reorganize internal
service organizations as the functions previously internal to
the customers’ organization are covered by the provider in
the PSS offering. In the case of new product lines, compa-
nies have more freedom to experiment with new business
models without running the risk of confusing or alienat-
ing existing customers. Consequently, a study by Sosna et al.
(2010) suggests that such experimentation can be invaluable
for companies that are looking to transform their business
model.
To summarize, it is unclear to what extent software ven-
dors can utilize their installed base of customers and product-
related resources when creating and distributing new soft-
ware as a service offerings based on existing products. At
the same time, companies that introduce PSS offerings for
existing products have to cope with additional inertia from
within organizational resources as well as the installed base
of customers. This is why I hypothesize that the reaction by
the stock market will be more positive when SaaS offerings
are introduced in the form of new product launches.
Hypothesis 1: Announcements that introduce
software as a service offerings for existing prod-
ucts will be perceived more negatively than an-
nouncements that introduce new software as a
service product lines.
2.3.2. Parallel perpetual offerings
The second choice companies need to make when intro-
ducing PSS offerings is whether or not to continue selling
the product with a traditional perpetual sales model. While
focusing solely on the PSS model can optimize the usage of
resources, a parallel offering can reduce the inertia the com-
pany has to overcome as customers are offered the choice to
purchase the product via a traditional sales model.
The introduction of a PSS offering, just like any other
business model innovation, often leads to two models being
run in parallel, which can lead to challenges of cognitive and
economic nature (Velu and Stiles (2013)). First, running two
business models in parallel means that the organization and
its employees need to hold two cognitive conceptions simul-
taneously. An example of problematic consequences result-
ing from this relates to incentivizing sales personnel, who in
traditional product-oriented firms are used to making large
license plus maintenance deals and are not likely to do well
or be motivated to sell smaller monthly or yearly subscrip-
tion packages (Gebauer et al. (2005)). If they are offered
the choice, they will most likely just stick to selling what they
know and understand.
Second, the two parallel offerings will compete against
each other for customer adoption and cause duplication
of resources. On one hand, a parallel business model ap-
proach could lead to the PSS offering cannibalizing3 (see
e.g. Chandy and Tellis (1998)) the perpetual software sales
offering. On the other hand, the internal competition be-
tween the business models could cause the perpetual offer-
ing to inhibit the PSS model’s success. Additionally, running
the two business models in parallel leads to duplication of
resources. For example, in the case of software, product
development, operations and support have to be provided
independently for both offerings. Thus, economies of scale
cannot be reached in a way possible with just one business
model.
At the same time, some scholars argue that it is some-
times preferable to offer multiple business models for one
product in parallel (Casadesus-Masanell and Tarzijan (2012);
Markides and Oyon (2010)). Birkinshaw (2001) points out
that parallel business models can be beneficial if the market
is heterogeneous enough to facilitate two business models for
different customer types with different needs. In the context
of software as a service, experts often speak of how the SaaS
model fits the needs of small and medium-sized businesses
well, because it makes complex and expensive applications
accessible to firms with limited availability of capital to in-
vest. This again refers to the "long-tail" market that can be
reached through the SaaS model. However, from a resource
optimization perspective the PSS model should make sense
for all sizes of firms.
Still, decisively choosing the business model that opti-
mizes resource utilization might not be the best choice. As I
have discussed, the transition from a product-oriented busi-
ness model to a PSS model is a big change in itself and forcing
customers into a new mold without providing them a choice
would increase the inertia the provider faces dramatically.
Customers might either not be willing or able to change the
way they acquire products, both of which are reasons why
Sosna et al. (2010) argue that it is important to experiment
when transitioning to a new business model. Thus, I hypoth-
esize that parallel offerings are perceived more positively by
the stock market than pure PSS approaches.
Hypothesis 2: Announcements that imply an al-
ternative perpetual software license offering to
the SaaS offering will be perceived more posi-
tively than announcements that do not imply a
parallel perpetual license offering.
Based on hypotheses 1 and 2, I formulate a 2-by-2 matrix
of four strategies software vendors can choose from when
introducing a SaaS offering, as illustrated in Figure 3. The
3Cannibalization stands for a phenomenon where the adoption of a new
product, service or business model decreases the value of existing assets or
routines. The value decrease in existing assets can concern both tangible
assets like equipment and intangible assets like employees’ knowledge and
capabilities
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2-by-2 is based on the two variables of existing vs. new prod-
ucts and parallel offering vs. no parallel offering. The four re-
sulting fields are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaus-
tive as there can be no strategies beyond these four and one
introduction can only belong to one of them.
Because the two variables interact in the form of resulting
strategies, I also have to look at possible interaction effects.
It could be argued that a parallel perpetual offering makes
less sense for new product launches than when transforming
existing products to SaaS, because of the expectations of the
installed base of customers. When introducing new product
lines, there are no existing customers to lose. However, if all
potential customers are observed, a pure SaaS offering might
discourage many enterprises from becoming customers of the
new software product. This is why I hypothesize that the in-
ertia argument that speaks for a parallel perpetual offering
also holds for new product launches. Thus, I predict no in-
teraction between the two variables, leading to the hypothe-
sized investor reactions that are presented in each of the four
fields in Figure 3.
2.3.3. Partnering for PSS delivery
The third choice to be made by companies when intro-
ducing new PSS offerings is whether to develop the service
capabilities of the product-service system alone or to partner
with external service providers in the creation of the offering.
This decision is very much of outsourcing nature, with com-
panies having to balance between the opportunities and risks
of externalizing the service activity to a third party (Rothaer-
mel et al. (2006)). At the same time, however, such a part-
nership represents a deeper form of cooperation than tradi-
tional outsourcing, where trust and interaction are more im-
portant than mere cost economics (Lee et al. (2003)). From a
resource optimization point-of-view, a partnership would al-
low the companies to benefit from the economies of scale an
infrastructure service provider can generate by hosting soft-
ware applications for multiple software vendors in a one-to-
many model. Thus, the comparative costs of the infrastruc-
ture service provider should be lower than the same costs
were the software vendor to host the applications itself. The
comparative production costs indeed are the best predictor of
outsourcing decisions (Walker and Weber (1984)). Addition-
ally, the demand for SaaS application computing and storage
usage can be difficult to predict, which means that volume
uncertainty is high, which is also an important reason for
outsourcing (Walker and Weber (1984)). Similarly, software
application platform providers can benefit from economies
of scale not accessible to individual software vendors, as they
have developed source code that can be used by multiple soft-
ware vendors in a one-to-many model. Additionally, infras-
tructure and platform partnerships can benefit the software
vendor in more qualitative ways. As these firms specialize in
the infrastructure and/or application platform development,
the software vendor can also benefit from their innovation
capabilities, leading to increased long-term competitiveness.
From an inertia perspective, it is not clear whether a part-
nership would increase or reduce inertia. On one hand, ac-
quiring the competencies and resources needed for the ad-
ditional services delivered as part of the PSS would reduce
inertia as the provider does not need to go through a pro-
cess of developing the resources and competencies. On the
other hand, a partnership with an external provider could
introduce new challenges in managing the relationships and
interfaces between the companies, leading to additional in-
ertia. Thus, studying how investors perceive this choice can
create interesting insights into the literature on the openness
of organizations to interact with their environments (Scott
and Davis (2015), pp. 87– 106).
I hypothesize that a partnership is perceived well by the
stock market as it enforces the resource optimization poten-
tial of PSS and reduces the need for the provider to transform
its organization.
Hypothesis 3: Announcements implying that the
software as a service offering is deployed on a
partner firm’s infrastructure and/or application
platform will be perceived more positively than
announcements that do not imply such coopera-
tion.
To summarize, I have identified three variables that com-
panies can influence when introducing new PSS offerings.
Furthermore, I have discussed the effect of all of the three
variables on the resource optimization related benefits and
inertia-related challenges. Based on this discussion, I have
generated three hypotheses to be tested in this empirical
study. The theoretical development is summarized in Table
1.
Even if the hypothesized influence of the three indepen-
dent variables on resource optimization and inertia is at least
partly straightforward, their relative importance is certainly
not trivial. Consequently, I employ the event study method to
measure the total effect of the independent variable on the
expected value creation potential of the firm (as measured
in abnormal returns of the stock price). In case other bene-
fits or downsides of the independent variables influence the
total movement caused in the dependent variable, they will
merely be attributed to either resource optimization benefits
or inertia drawbacks. In my opinion, however, resource op-
timization and inertia as high-level constructs should cover
the benefits and drawbacks in an exhaustive way.
3. Methodology
Event study is a method widely used in academic stud-
ies to measure the impact on the stock price of changes in
corporate policy (McWilliams and Siegel (1997)) and other
corporate events like product and business model innovation
(Alexy and George (2013); Fosfuri and Giarratana (2009)).
The benefit of using stock market returns is that they are
more objective and subject to less manipulation by managers
than accounting measures (McWilliams and Siegel (1997)).
Based on this widely established research design, I follow
the steps needed to complete an event study in this chap-
ter: defining what is considered an event, collecting data on
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Figure 3: Four options for introducing new SaaS offering and hypothesized investor reactions (own illustration).
Table 1: Theoretical development of the effect of independent variables on resource optimization and inertia as well as the
resulting hypotheses (own illustration).
Variable Resource optimization Inertia Hypothesized effect
Existing product line + - - - (H1)
Parallel perpetual offering - ++ + (H2)
Partnering + + + (H3)
Notes: The effects are comparison effect to the baseline value; for existing product line the baseline is new product introduction, for parallel perpetual offering
the baseline is no parallel perpetual offering and for partnering the baseline is no partnering. A positive effect on inertia means that inertia decreases, i.e. the
expected investor reaction improves. A positive effect on resource optimization means that resource optimization increases, improving the expected investor
reaction. The values of one or two plusses or one or two minuses are not comparable between variables, they are merely used to compare the hypothesized
effect of two conflicting effects (e.g. the positive effect on inertia of a parallel perpetual offering outweighs the negative effect on resource optimization).
events, controlling for confounding events, and selecting pa-
rameters to calculate abnormal returns (MacKinlay (1997);
McWilliams and Siegel (1997)).
3.1. Event definition
As this study focuses on servitization as a product-level
phenomenon, the interest is on events where a software ven-
dor introduces a new software as a service offering.
An event is the announcement by a software ven-
dor of a software as a service offering for enter-
prise customers, either in the form of a new prod-
uct launch or a new offering for an existing prod-
uct.
I restrict the event definition only for software that is sold
to enterprise customers in order to avoid the heterogeneity
between consumer and enterprise applications. My assump-
tion is that enterprise customers are slower to adapt to new
models of purchasing than individuals and thus the inertia
effects in B2B software are more important. Thus, consumer
applications should lead to more positive reactions, but I do
not analyze this further as the amount of consumer appli-
cations identified was too small (n = 8). Additionally, con-
sumer software often is more content-oriented (e.g. games,
media and entertainment and education), making it more dif-
ficult to compare to enterprise applications.
To specify the event definition further, I formulate defini-
tions for (1) what firms are considered as software vendors
and (2) what is considered a software as a service offering.
The restrictions are based on the IDC’s Software taxonomy
(Morris (2015)), a widely accepted report in the software in-
dustry.
To be classified as a software vendor event in the defini-
tion, the focal company has to own intellectual property for
the software and sell a replicated product in a one-to-many
model. First, resellers, distributors and third-party service
providers that do not own the software source code are not
considered to be software vendors but channels for software
vendors. For events where multiple companies announce
SaaS offerings together, only the software vendor as per the
definition above is included in the sample. Second, software
companies assemble a package of code from components and
sell multiple copies in a one-to-many business model. This
means that non-replicable software products like completely
individual software solutions are not sold by software ven-
dors and thus not included in the sample.
As discussed in the literature review, the definition of soft-
ware as a service is not trivial as the concept has many aspects
to it. I define software as a service rather pragmatically and
accept any type of technical implementation or stage of pro-
visioning software as a service. For my definition the service
character of provisioning software as a service is decisive and
thus any offering is considered, where the software source
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code is bundled into a subscription or other type of service
as opposed to being sold as such, typically via a perpetual
license (Morris (2015)).
3.2. Sample
The events were collected using a headline and lead
paragraph search of press releases between 28.02.2001 and
31.12.2015 from three leading North-American newswires:
PR Newswire, Business Wire and Market Wire. 28th of
February 2001, the publishing date of the SIIA (Software &
Information Industry Association) report on SaaS, was cho-
sen as the starting point of the study timeframe because I do
not want to include any potential exogenous effects of this
report being published in the sample. This starting date also
makes it possible to exclude potential exogenous effects of
the dot-com bubble, which is widely seen to have climaxed on
10th of March 2000 (Agrawal et al. (2006)). The search was
conducted using the Dow Jones Factiva interactive database
with the following search string:
(publish* or announc* or launch* or releas* or
unveil* or reveal* or introduc*) and (saas or soft-
ware as a service or on demand or pay per use
or pay as you go or per month or monthly or
per year or yearly or subscri* or (hosted and ser-
vice) or (cloud and service) or application service
provi* or ASP)
The search string includes a broad list of ways to express
delivering software as a service, including cloud and hosted
services, the ASP model, different subscription expressions as
well as the actual words software as a service or the common
abbreviation SaaS. The Factiva search engine automatically
tests replacing spaces with dashes, meaning that this did not
have to be explicitly coded into the search string. Finally, the
asterisks imply any amount of any characters following the
word, which allows controlling for all kinds of formulations
of words like published, publishes or publishing.
The search was repeated for all companies listed in
the NASDAQ National Market or the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE) and categorized in the 4510 - Software &
Services Segment in the Global Industry Classification Stan-
dard (GICS), collected through the OSIRIS database. Addi-
tionally, in order to include large technology companies that
operate both in hardware and software, companies included
in the S&P 500 index under the broader GICS category 45 -
Information Technology were added to the list of companies.
I restricted the study to companies listed in these US stock
exchanges because of problems related to event studies in
multi-country settings (Park (2004)). This does not mean,
however, that the companies would have to have their seat in
the US. Similarly, companies that are listed in the NASDAQ or
NYSE stock exchanges secondarily to another foreign stock
exchange are equally viable to be included in the sample of
firms.
Overall, this led to a list of 412 companies, from which
some (e.g. Cornerstone OnDemand) have arguably been op-
erating with the SaaS model from their inception, but be-
cause drawing a line between a pure SaaS company and a
non-pure SaaS company cannot be done fully objectively, I
included these companies in the sample. To make sure that
this does not falsify the results of the study, I controlled for
the firms’ experience in the SaaS model.
To avoid any bias caused by only looking at events for
companies that are still listed on the stock market at the time
of the study and have not been acquired or bankrupted, I
added 11 companies that have been delisted from one of the
two stock exchanges and that have introduced SaaS offer-
ings within the period of analysis to the list of companies.
The events identified for these companies were coded with
a dummy variable to be able to measure whether this has
any effect on the final model. One potential bias could be
that delisted companies have been more aggressive and have
taken more risks in the transformation process to SaaS of-
ferings, which in turn could influence the investor reactions.
This addition led to a total of 423 companies considered in
the study.
The fact that the search string only contains one global
and-operator combined with a list of 14 different ways to
describe a service-based delivery of software means that the
search string was highly inefficient with a full text search of
press releases, because words like subscrip* come across in
numerous meanings and contexts. However, when used with
a headline and lead paragraph search, the search worked ef-
ficiently as it controlled for any notion that implies the in-
troduction of a SaaS offering, even if announced as a part
of a bigger announcement or if the company did not explic-
itly express that the new offering was in fact a SaaS offer-
ing. The lead paragraph of press releases without exception
summarizes shortly what is being announced. In order to
make sure the headline and first paragraph search was not
systematically excluding relevant events, two relatively ma-
jor firms, Adobe Systems Inc. and Intuit Inc., were selected
and the search was repeated for them with a full text search.
With the full text search, Factiva found 873 and 723 press
releases for the two firms respectively, whereas the headline
and lead paragraph search resulted to 114 and 60 press re-
leases. Despite the huge increase in results, no new events
matching the event definition were found with the full text
search compared to the headline and lead paragraph search.
Because the search was conducted individually for each
of the 423 companies, it was not sensible to count the total
amount of events the search string found for each company.
However, I estimate that the average number of press releases
per company was around 100 for the biggest companies in
the S&P 500 index (64 companies) and around 20 for the
rest of the companies. This leads to an estimated 13 000
press releases analyzed in total.
Out of these around 13 000 press releases, 523 were
initially identified to fit the event definition based on my
analysis of their content. When these events were analyzed
more precisely during the coding of independent variables,
164 were dropped from the sample for various reasons. For
example, some announcements turned out to announce a
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non-SaaS product (e.g. Smith Micro Revue launch - Dec
17, 2007), whereas others turned out to announce a gen-
eral SaaS strategy (e.g. Autodesk Business Strategy - Apr 4,
2001). Another common reason for excluding an event from
the sample was that the announcement merely concerned
a new version of a product that was previously already of-
fered with the SaaS model (e.g. Callidus Software launches
Monaco 2011 - Aug 1, 2011). Thus I finally ended up with a
sample of 359 events as listed in appendix C. The distribution
of these events over time is illustrated in Figure 4.
The event distribution over time shows how it took until
2007 for the SaaS model to really establish itself in the indus-
try. Amazon Web Services started operating in 2006, which
might either be a reason or a cause of the apparent increase
in the amount of SaaS announcements. Interestingly as well,
SaaS seemed to have reached a temporary peak in 2008, af-
ter which the density of announcements declined until 2013
before going up again. This seems to resemble the shape of
Gartner’s hype cycle with its peak of inflated expectations and
the through of disillusionment (Gartner, Inc. (2016)).
3.3. Confounding events
Controlling for confounding events is a crucial part of the
event study methodology, although it is often disregarded by
researchers (McWilliams and Siegel (1997)). In order to be
able to attribute the observed abnormal returns in the stock
price to the studied event, one needs to ensure that no other
apparent company-specific event is causing the abnormal re-
turns. Thus, the presence of confounding events (e.g. an-
nouncement of important partnerships or new products, fi-
nancial reports, or the change in a key executive) means that
the corresponding event has to be excluded from the sample
(MacKinlay (1997); McWilliams and Siegel (1997)).
Because it is likely that the confounding events (just like
the studied events, see below) can also be anticipated and
that the reaction to them continues on the day after the event,
I controlled for confounding events during the event win-
dow as well as a trading day before and a trading day af-
ter it. This means that confounding events were controlled
for a five-day window around the event date. Out of the
359 events, 121 were flagged as not confounded and 238
as confounded. Confounding events were also controlled for
a three-day period in case the five-day window would lead to
a too reduced sample. This way, 155 events were flagged as
not confounded and 204 as confounded.
As noted in preceding event studies in the software in-
dustry, a reason for the big amount of confounded events is
that software firms often make announcements in bundles
during events like developer conferences (Alexy and George
(2013)). To reduce potential bias on the results caused by
some companies’ events being more likely to end up in the fi-
nal sample, I employ a two-stage Heckman model that in the
first stage estimates the likelihood of an event entering the
sample based on company characteristics and includes the
resulting inverse Mills ratio into the second-stage regression
model.
3.4. Parameters for calculating the abnormal returns
In event studies, the reaction to new information by the
stock market is estimated based on abnormal returns in the
stock price. To be able to define what returns are abnormal
for the firm’s stock, any global effects across all firms have
to be excluded from analysis and a level of expected returns
has to be estimated. To achieve this, daily returns are calcu-
lated using the closing price for both the firm and a compa-
rable market. Then, over a period of time before the event
called the estimation window, the two resulting time series
are linked via a linear regression model. The resulting re-
gression equation and the returns of the comparable market
are then used to calculate the expected returns for the stock
on every day of the event window. The expected returns are
then deducted from the real returns to arrive at abnormal re-
turns for each day. Finally, the abnormal returns are totaled
over the event window to arrive at cumulative abnormal re-
turns (CAR). Thus, one needs to define the event and esti-
mation windows as well as a method to estimate the market
returns in order to conduct the event study. An overview of
relevant terminology of the various time windows discussed
here is presented in Figure 6. For the event window, I se-
lect a period of three trading days: the day of the event as
well as the trading days immediately before and after it. As
information about announcements often leaks to the market
before the announcement, the potential influences of leaked
information should also be included in the analysis of mar-
ket reactions. Similarly, observing the returns long enough
after the event helps capture a more complete picture of the
reaction to the new information. However, a problem with
including anticipation effects and delayed reactions in the
event window is that it reduces sample size as confounding
events become more probable with longer event windows
(McWilliams and Siegel (1997)). Some researchers have
even shown that markets adjust to new information rapidly
(Dann et al. (1977); Mitchell and Netter (1989)), which is
why some event studies have not considered the returns of
the day after the event at all (Alexy and George (2013)). Re-
gardless, I believe it is important to include the day after the
event in the event window as many of the announcements
in the sample were made late in the afternoon, 2PM or later,
leaving the market with only 2 hours to adjust on the day of
the event. Additionally, with many of the events I analyzed
individually to understand the data, I noticed that the stock
market often counter-reacted to the high abnormal returns
of the event date on the day after, which could hint that the
market needed more time to really understand the qualita-
tive data provided in the announcements.
For the estimation window, I select a window of 126 trad-
ing days. This follows the gold standard set by previous event
studies in the IT industry that have often used a 125-day win-
dow (Agrawal et al. (2006); Alexy and George (2013); Oh
et al. (2006)). The reason I add one more day to the 125
days is that by making the estimation window devisable with
the event window, including each day of the estimation win-
dow in the calculation of the parametric Corrado z-statistic
becomes possible. Thus, with the mere addition of one day
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Figure 4: Distribution of studied events over time from 2001 to 2015 (own illustration).
Figure 5: Distribution of all events and non-confounded events from 2001 to 2015 (own illustration).
to the estimation window length, the power of the Corrado
z-statistic improves by 2.5 percent (1/41). I separate the es-
timation and event windows with a lag of 1 trading day. In
the robustness checks, the lengths of the event and estima-
tion windows are alternated to analyze the sensitivity of the
results to the selected values.
Finally, I use the market model to calculate the abnor-
mal returns caused by the events. There are many alter-
native ways to do that, such as the mean-adjusted returns,
market-adjusted returns, and the Capital Asset Pricing Mod-
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Figure 6: Relevant terminology of time windows in event studies (adapted from(MacKinlay (1997))).
els (CAPM), but according to Armitage (1995), Park (2004)
and Agrawal et al. (2006), the market model is the most com-
monly used one in event studies, partly due to its ease of
implementation. Binder (1998) also showed that despite its
simplicity and some statistical challenges related to it, the
market model in most cases is at least as good as the alter-
natives. To estimate the returns of the comparable market,
I mainly use the S&P 500 index. Many previous event stud-
ies in the IT industry have employed the NASDAQ Composite
(Agrawal et al. (2006); Alexy and George (2013); Oh et al.
(2006)), which I also use in robustness checks. However, the
reason for mainly using the S&P 500 index is that 73 out of
the 123 companies (59%) with events in the sample are part
of the NASDAQ Composite index, whereas only 19 (15%)
are part of the S&P 500 index. This means that when us-
ing the NASDAQ Composite index, the comparable market
returns include the returns of the stock being studied, poten-
tially biasing the results. All of the time series data for the
studied firms and indices were extracted from the Thomson
Reuters Datastream and corrected for non-trading days like
public holidays.
3.5. Measures used in multivariate regression model
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) that were cal-
culated for each event as described above were used as the
dependent variable of a multivariate regression model. In
order to test the hypotheses derived in this thesis, additional
independent variables were coded to measure the following
characteristics of each announcement: new/existing prod-
uct, parallel perpetual offering, delivery partnership as well
as the firm’s experience in the SaaS business model. The
coding was conducted by the author for all events and re-
peated by another researcher for 20 events (18 % of the
non-confounded sample) to make sure that coding was ac-
curate and independent of subjective biases. Out of the 80
re-coded values, 77 (96.3%) received the same coding in
the re-coding as initially. The corresponding Cohen’s Kappa
(Cohen (1960)), a coefficient that measures inter-coder re-
liability and includes the probability of matching coding by
chance, was 92.5% for the initial re-coding. Discussion about
the three disagreements with the secondary coder made me
confident that no re-coding is necessary for all events. Exam-
ples of the coding can be found in appendix B and C.
With the variable "existing product", I differentiate be-
tween new product launches and introductions of SaaS of-
ferings for existing products that have an installed base of
customers. To determine the variable for each event, the se-
mantics of the press release were analyzed. A new product
launch often uses different formulations than an introduction
of a new offering for an existing product, which de it conve-
nient to code the variable in most cases. However, sometimes
the differentiation was not straightforward, as press releases
that seemed to represent new product launches were in fact
introductions of new offerings for existing products. This
sometimes became evident from the name of the offering,
which often used the terms On- Demand or Cloud after the
name of an existing product. In other cases, the researcher
had to analyze the description given about the product and
its customers to determine whether it is novel or not. For
the purposes of this study, novelty did not refer to the nov-
elty of the underlying technology or source code, but to the
existence of an installed base of customers. For example in
the case of an ERP software offering that is based on exist-
ing technology but targets a new customer group, the event
would have been coded as to concern a new product.
Regarding parallel perpetual offerings, the variable differ-
entiates between strategies that explicitly communicate the
SaaS offering as a mere alternative to a perpetual product
sales model and strategies that communicate the SaaS offer-
ing without mention of an alternative to customers. One ex-
ample of explicitly communicating that the SaaS offering is a
mere alternative to a perpetual offering is to mention other
delivery models in the press release. Another way in which
it becomes obvious that the SaaS offering is a mere alterna-
tive to a perpetual offering is when the company announces
the offering with a byname like On-Demand or Cloud. It is
obviously possible that poor communication might lead to a
misinterpretation of the strategy used in the focal event, but
a focused analysis beyond the press releases would be impos-
sible to conduct in a consistent way over all events across the
range of 15 years. Thus, I accept the limitations of basing
the coding merely on the communication used in the press
release and assume the impact of this to be minimal over a
large amount of events studied.
With regard to partnering for delivery in the case of soft-
ware as a service, a partnership to deliver the integrated
product-service system refers to partnering with an infras-
tructure and/or platform (as a service) provider. Similarly
to the variables above, this is coded based on what the fo-
cal firm communicates in the press release. Whenever an-
other company was mentioned in the announcement, I ana-
lyzed whether the cooperation regarded the delivery of the
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software as a service offering in the form of infrastructure
and/or platform provided by the partner company. This was
especially differentiated from cases where two companies to-
gether developed a product that was offered with the SaaS
model. Again, it is possible that a partnership was left un-
mentioned in some press releases, but because companies so
often mentioned it very explicitly, I believe the potential error
caused by this to be negligible.
Additionally, a plethora of variables are used to control
for non-spuriousness of the observed effects of independent
variables. Some of these control variables are used in the se-
lection equation of the Heckman two-stage regression model
to control for the effects of some type of firms being more
likely to introduce confounding events and thus not enter the
sample.
First, I control for the effects of potential investor learn-
ing effects by controlling for the period in time (pre and post
2006). As the software as a service business model repre-
sents a completely new form of conducting business in the
software industry, it is plausible that firms that entered the
model in the earliest years in the sample were punished for
their category divergence (Alexy and George (2013)) with an
illegitimacy discount (Zuckerman (1999)). Several different
discretization approaches for time were tested but no signif-
icant increases in model quality were achieved by going past
a categorization with two levels.
Second, I control for firm size as measured in number
of employees. It has been shown that firm size positively
influences legitimacy and ability to introduce new categories
(Greenwood and Suddaby (2006)). Additionally, larger firms
are likely to be influenced less by the introduction of a new
category, meaning that the scale of a potential increase or
decrease in value would be smaller for large firms.
Third, I use two variables to approximate the firm’s expo-
sure to and experience with the SaaS business model. Firstly,
I simply approximate whether the company has previously
delivered software through the SaaS business model. This
was coded as a binary variable based on the company having
previous events in the collection of events and in a few cases
based on the company description at the end of the press
release. Because some companies in the sample might have
been "Born in the Cloud" (companies that have operated with
the SaaS model from their inception), I had to make sure that
such companies would not get coded with no experience with
SaaS for their first event in the sample. Secondly, I accumu-
late the amount of events per company to get an approxima-
tion of the amount of experience with the SaaS model, and
divide this by firm size in employees to control for the fact
that bigger firms are likely to have more announcements in
the sample.
Finally, I control for absorptive capacity, which describes
a firm’s ability to create and utilize knowledge in a way that
helps it gain and sustain competitive advantage (Zahra and
George (2002)), as it is likely to influence a firm’s capability
to transform its business model and introduce new categories
(Alexy and George (2013)). Additionally, highly innovative
firms might lose some of the value of their innovativeness
when they stop selling product versions based on innovation
cycles and allow customers to subscribe to a service that gives
them constant access to the newest version. A company that
is able to introduce new and attractive features yearly, for
example, would in the subscription model lose the ability to
sell new products based on the new features and would have
to give them to subscription customers for free. Based on the
original definition by (Cohen and Levinthal (1990)), I ap-
proximate absorptive capacity using the R&D-to-sales ratio,
which is calculated using the latest reported sales and R&D
figures at the time of the event.
Additionally, I use the following firm attributes to predict
the absence of confounding events: Sales (in thousands of
dollars), sales-per-employee (in thousands of dollars), sales
growth (over the past year) and PPE (property, plant and
equipment)-to-sales ratio. The selection of these variables
follows the example of previous event studies (Alexy and
George (2013)).
4. Results
In this chapter, the results of the analyses are presented in
detail. First, the influence of the selection of parameters for
calculating the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) is ana-
lyzed. Second, descriptive statistics and correlations between
all variables are inspected. Third, the mean values of CARs
based on various values of independent variables are inves-
tigated in univariate analyses. Furthermore, due to a signif-
icant increase in the mean values of the CAR after the year
2005, the univariate analyses are repeated with a subset of
data that only includes events from 2006 onwards in chapter
4.4. Based on the knowledge gathered about the influence
of individual independent variables on the dependent vari-
able, multivariate analyses using various regression models
are performed in the fifth subchapter. Finally, in the sixth and
last part of this chapter robustness checks are performed to
investigate how the parameters used for calculating the CARs
influence the outcomes of the multivariate regression model.
4.1. Calculating cumulative abnormal returns
To understand whether an announcement of a SaaS of-
fering leads to a positive or a negative reaction in the stock
price, I deploy a student’s t-test as well as the non-parametric
rank test by Corrado (1989) on the mean values of CAR calcu-
lated with various input variables. I find that over the whole
sample, the mean reaction to the announcement of a SaaS of-
fering is very slightly negative, but not significantly different
from zero. By varying the estimation window, the event win-
dow, and the comparison index, I confirm that an announce-
ment of a new SaaS offering in itself is perceived neither pos-
itively nor negatively. The results of tests performed on the
whole sample are summarized in Table 2.
What stands out from the analysis is that none of the vari-
ations of the input variables leads to a mean CAR that is sig-
nificantly different from zero, even at the 10% level. Interest-
ingly however, using an event window that does not include
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the trading day after the event somewhat increases the mean
value of the CAR. This could be an indication that investors
initially react more positively to the announcements of new
SaaS offerings and that the following day, on average, sees
the share price of the firms’ stocks backtrack somewhat.
To look into this further, I calculate the average abnormal
returns (AAR) for the event date as well as the trading days
immediately before and after the event. Furthermore, I di-
vide the set of 121 non-confounded events into two subsets,
one for events with a positive CAR and one for events with a
negative CAR. The resulting AARs are summarized in Table
3. Comparing the AARs for each of the three days can help
understand the data better, making the choice of an event
window more informed.
The summary of the AARs in Table 3 highlights two pat-
terns in the data. Firstly, whenever the cumulative abnormal
returns are negative, all three dates receive negative abnor-
mal returns on average. Meanwhile, whenever the CARs are
positive, all three dates receive positive abnormal returns on
average. Secondly, the AAR of the event date is without ex-
ception higher than the AARs of the days before and after the
event. Most surprisingly, this also applies to negative events.
Merely publishing information regarding a new SaaS offering
seems to have a value in itself, almost as if the impact of the
information provided would always get overvalued on the
day of the announcement. Furthermore, negative events do
not get overvalued in relative but absolute terms, meaning
that they do not receive overly negative abnormal returns.
Instead, their abnormal returns for the event date are overly
high compared to that of the days before and after the event.
Thus, the overvaluation gets balanced out on the trading days
prior and after the event, especially for events with negative
CAR. Interestingly, the variance in AARs for events with pos-
itive CAR is really small compared to the same variance for
events with negative CAR. Because of these observations, it
seems even more important to include the anticipation effects
as well as a considerable post-event reaction in the calcula-
tion of CARs.
4.2. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
Next, I look into descriptive statistics of all variables as
well as correlations between them, both of which are pre-
sented in Table 4. Regarding the descriptive statistics, one
thing worth mentioning is that some of the control variables
have less observations than the number of events, meaning
that their inclusion in regression models reduces the sam-
ple size slightly. Because not all companies report R&D ex-
penditures and number of employees in their annual reports,
this simply has to be accepted. Fortunately, the sample size
is big enough for this not to cause too much of a statistical
limitation. Another interesting number is the maximum for
R&D-per-sales (proxy for absorptive capacity), which shows
a value of 1.009. This seems illogical at first, but looking into
the event more precisely reveals that the company in ques-
tion was growing at a great pace and thus was likely just
aggressively investing in R&D. Furthermore, the descriptive
statistics of the dependent variable show that the most neg-
ative and positive CARs are roughly as far away from zero.
The correlation table shows that the CAR correlates the
strongest with the variables “partnering” and “PPE-to-sales”.
The variable “existing product” seems to be moderately cor-
related with the CAR, whereas “parallel offering” is only very
slightly correlated with the CAR. When it comes to correla-
tions between independent variables, "existing product" and
"parallel offering" are highly correlated, with a correlation co-
efficient of 0.6762. This is not surprising as the combination
of new product, no parallel offering, for example, occurs a lot
more in the sample than the combination of new product and
parallel offering. Because of this, dummies for each combi-
nation of these two variables, as represented in Figure 3, will
be used to control for any spuriousness caused by the high
correlation in robustness checks. Additionally, the number of
employees (proxy for firm size) and sales are almost perfectly
correlated. This poses no problems as the two variables are
not used in the same regression models.
All in all, the correlation table cannot reveal much about
the connections between the independent and dependent
variables. Thus, I continue by performing univariate analyses
that will reveal how different values of selected independent
variables change the mean value of the CARs.
4.3. Univariate analysis of the dependent variable
Before diving into multivariate analyses about how the
independent variables influence the market’s reaction, I will
have a look at how some of the independent variables in-
fluence the CARs. First, by splitting the sample based on
the time of announcement, I find that the mean CAR of an-
nouncements in the early years of the studied timeframe is
significantly lower than in the later years. Indeed, by splitting
the sample in two subsets, I find that before 2006 the mean
reaction to the announcements is significantly negative (p <
0.01) and after 2006 positive and significantly different from
the mean value before 2006 (p < 0.001), as seen in Figure 7
and Table 5.
If the sample is split into more than 2 categories based on
the time of announcement, it is evident that after a certain
time, the influence of time disappears. This is visualized in
Figure 8, where the data has been split to four equally long
periods. In the first of these periods, the median and mean
values of the CAR are significantly lower than in the latter
three. Furthermore, after the first period no increase in the
mean CAR can be observed. One should note that the sam-
ple is split into equally long intervals, not into equally large
subsets. There are two important notes
that should be made related to that. First, the graphic
seems to suggest that splitting the sample into early and late
periods would make the most sense at the end of year 2004.
However, statistically the most significant difference between
the two subsets can be reached with a cutoff at the end of
2005, mostly due to the increased size of the early subset as
compared to a cutoff at the end of 2004. Second, because the
categorization of the sample into subsets was made based on
time intervals instead of subset sizes, the differences in the
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Table 2: Univariate analysis of mean CARs in different periods of time (own illustration).
Estimation Event N Index Mean SD Student’s t- Corrado
window window statistic z-statistic
126 [-1,1] 121 S&P500 0.0002 0.0572 0.0412 1.3477
249 [-1,1] 121 S&P500 0.0004 0.0584 0.0729 0.1113
126 [-1,1] 121 NASDAQ 0.0004 0.0570 0.0811 0.3483
126 [-1,0] 121 S&P500 0.0013 0.0453 0.3320 0.4900
126 [0] 155 S&P500 0.0019 0.0286 0.8311 1.5478
Notes: † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 (all tests are two-tailed). Estimation window has to be devisable with event window size to include every day of the
estimation window in the calculation of the Corrado z-statistic. Event window implies the trading days included, relative to the event date. For event window
with size 1, events that had confounding events in a 5-day window around the event but none in a 3-day window were added to the sample, thus increasing
the sample size to 155. Corrado test statistic calculated for complete event window. One should note that the power of the Corrado test by definition increases
as the event window gets smaller.
Table 3: AARs for different days based on various subsets of non-confounded events (own illustration).
Day All events Events with negative CAR Events with positive CAR
N 121 66 55
-1 -0.0020 -0.0136 0.0120
0 0.0033 -0.0061 0.0147
+1 -0.0012 -0.0140 0.0143
Notes: CARs are calculated with a three-day event window, 126-day estimation window and using the S&P500 index. Day refers to the trading day relative
to the event date.
Figure 7: Cumulative abnormal returns before 2006 and from 2006 onwards (own illustration).
variances of the CAR between subsets seem greater than they
actually are. Based on the graphic, it would seem that the
variance of CARs in the first period is the greatest, but most of
the difference between the 25 and 75 percentiles is explained
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by the smaller size of the subset (N = 17) compared to the
other three (N = 27;44;33).
The negativity of initial reactions to new SaaS offerings
could be explained by category legitimacy and emergence
(Alexy and George (2013)). Investors seem to initially pun-
ish companies that introduce novel SaaS business models
with an illegitimacy discount (Zuckerman (1999)), as it rep-
resents something they do not fully understand. Interest-
ingly, Amazon Web Services were launched by Amazon in
year 2006, which as an individual event might also have had
an influence on the legitimacy of the SaaS business model.
On the other hand, it might also be possible that the company
was created as a consequence of the increased legitimacy of
SaaS. The mean values of cumulative abnormal returns be-
fore and after 2006 as well as tests performed on them are
summarized in Table 5.
Next, I split the sample in four using the two-by-two pre-
sented in Figure 3 to analyze the mean CARs and their differ-
ences based on the announcement type. The results of this
analysis, as summarized in Table 6, show that there are con-
siderable differences in the mean values for different event
types. Although the differences are not statistically signifi-
cant from each other, this gives initial indication of a correla-
tion between the event type and the market’s reaction. More
specifically, the best mean reaction seems to be achieved by
introducing a SaaS offering for a new product with a parallel
perpetual offering and the worst result by not offering a par-
allel perpetual offering for a SaaS offering that concerns an
existing product line. Also, it seems that the variable "existing
product" seems to carry more weight than "parallel offering",
as the difference in CAR when moving from new products
to existing products has a higher volume than the difference
when moving from no parallel offerings to parallel offerings.
One should also note a limitation caused by the small sample
sizes (3 and 13) in two of the four categories (new product,
parallel offering and existing product, no parallel offering).
Due to the low number of observations in two of the four
event types and the fact that the two underlying variables do
not seem to interact4, I also conduct a univariate analysis for
the two variables independently of each other. These analy-
ses are summarized in Tables 7 and 8.
Table 7 confirms that announcements of new SaaS of-
ferings for existing products lead to more negative reactions
than announcements where the SaaS offering is announced
for a new product line. Here, the mean reaction to an an-
nouncement concerning an existing product leads to a 1.6
percent decrease in company value. This value is signifi-
cantly different from zero on the 5 percent level, although
only when measured with the student’s t-test, not with the
non- parametric Corrado test. This, seems to conflict with
the prevalent opinion that the nonparametric Corrado test
should perform better on abnormal returns data, because it
4New product vs. existing product seems to always have the same direc-
tion independent of the existence of a parallel offering. The same applies to
the existence parallel offerings independent of whether the announcement
concerns a new or an existing product.
does not assume a normal distribution of the data (Campbell
and Wesley (1993); Corrado (1989)). This pattern will con-
tinue to show across the univariate analyses presented in this
chapter, and provides a key insight for future event studies.
It seems that sometimes the absolute values of abnormal re-
turns are more similar with each other than their relative size
as compared to abnormal returns during the estimation win-
dow. Additionally, Table 7 shows that an announcement for a
new product line on average leads to a 2.2 percent higher in-
crease in company value than that for existing product lines,
and that the difference is also significant on the 5 percent
level.
The univariate analysis on how the existence of a parallel
perpetual offering influences the CARs, as presented in Table
8, indicates that the existence of a parallel perpetual offering
leads to a decrease in CARs as compared to no parallel offer-
ing. This is surprising, because when looking at the reactions
for all four event types, the conclusion was that a parallel of-
fering improves the mean reaction both for new and existing
products. The reason for this inconsistency is most probably
that only 3 out of the 20 observations of a parallel offering
are for new products, for which the mean reactions are sig-
nificantly better than for existing products. This means that
the low average of the 17 observations for existing products
weighs down the total average for events where a parallel
offering is given. Exactly the opposite happens for observa-
tions with no parallel offering. In other words, the correla-
tion between the two independent variables leads to wrong
conclusions when looking at them separately. Later on in the
multivariate analyses one will indeed notice that the variable
parallel offering has exactly the opposite effect on the CARs,
meaning that an indication of a parallel offering will improve
the investors’ reaction to the announcement.
Finally, I perform similar tests for the independent vari-
able that measures partnering with an infrastructure or plat-
form service provider for the delivery of the SaaS offering.
I again find a difference in mean values, indicating a con-
nection between the dependent and independent variables.
More specifically, the mean value of CARs with partnering
is significantly different from 0 and from the mean value of
CARs when no partnering exists on the 10 and 5 percent lev-
els, respectively. Interestingly however, the parametric Cor-
rado z-statistic is not significantly different from 0, similarly
to the analysis of existing and new product lines. Regard-
less, indication exists that an announcement of a SaaS offer-
ing leads to an increase in the market value of the software
vendor if the offering is announced to be delivered in coop-
eration with a cloud infrastructure or platform provider. The
mean values of CAR when partnering and not partnering as
well as the tests performed on them are summarized in Table
9.
Because a significant difference in the CARs was observed
depending on whether the event took place before 2006 or
not, it seems promising to take one further step in the uni-
variate analysis and subset the data to only include events
after 2005. Thus, the analyses presented in this chapter are
now repeated for the independent variables to see whether
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Figure 8: Cumulative abnormal returns over the studied time window split in four equally long periods (own illustration).
Table 5: Univariate analysis of mean CARs in different periods of time (own illustration).
Time period N Mean SD Difference Corrado z-statistic
2001 - 2006 19 -0.038† 0.079 -1.808†
2006 - 2015 102 0.007 0.049 0.045** 1.230
Notes: † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 (all tests are two-tailed). Difference shows the difference in mean value to the row above. Corrado test statistic
is calculated using the complete event and estimation windows.
Table 6: Univariate analysis of mean CARs in different event types (own illustration).
Event type N Mean SD Difference Corrado z-statistic
New product, no parallel offering 85 0.006 0.062 1.194
New product, parallel offering 3 0.013 0.034 0.006 1.414
Existing product, no parallel offering 13 -0.019 0.044 -0.025 -0.534
Existing product, parallel offering 20 -0.014 0.044 -0.020 -1.299
Notes: † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 (all tests are two-tailed). Difference shows the difference in mean value to the row above. Corrado test statistic
is calculated using the complete event and estimation windows.
Table 7: Univariate analysis of mean CARs for existing and new product lines (own illustration).
Event type N Mean SD Difference Corrado z-statistic
Existing product 33 -0.016* 0.043 -1.240
New product 84 0.006 0.061 0.022* 1.393
Notes: † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 (all tests are two-tailed). Difference shows the difference in mean value to the first row. Corrado test statistic is
calculated using the complete event and estimation windows.
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Table 8: Univariate analysis of mean CARs when a parallel perpetual offering is or is not implied (own illustration).
Event type N Mean SD Difference Corrado z-statistic
No parallel offering 98 0.003 0.060 -0.990
Parallel offering 23 -0.011 0.043 -0.013 -0.804
Notes: † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 (all tests are two-tailed). Difference shows the difference in mean value to the first row. Corrado test statistic is
calculated using the complete event and estimation windows.
Table 9: Univariate analysis of mean CARs with and without a delivery partner (own illustration).
Partnering choice N Mean SD Difference Corrado z-statistic
Without partnering 96 -0.005 0.057 -0.007
With partnering 25 0.021† 0.054 0.026* 1.348
Notes: † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 (all tests are two-tailed). Difference shows the difference in mean to the row above. Corrado test statistic is
calculated using the complete event and estimation windows.
it is possible to conclude anything about the mean values of
the stock market reaction depending on their values.
4.4. Univariate analysis of the dependent variable after 2006
First, I look at the mean CARs for the different event
types. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 10.
Compared to Table 6, which summarized the analysis for
the whole sample of events, no radical differences can be
found in Table 10. The directions of the differences in CARs
between the event types have remained the same and the
means across all event types have the same sign (positive or
negative). From the tests of statistical significance, it can be
noted that with 95% certainty introducing a SaaS offering for
new products without a parallel perpetual offering leads to
an increase in the market value of the software vendor. Inter-
estingly again, the student’s t-test produces a p-value lower
than 5 percent, whereas the parametric Corrado test does not
even produce a p-value smaller than 10 percent. For events
where the product is new and a parallel offering is implied,
the Corrado test produces significant results on the 10 per-
cent level. However, the sample size of N = 2 does not allow
any reliable interpretations.
Next, I look at the two variables that constitute the four
event types for the subset of events after 2005, just like I did
for all events. The results of the analyses are summarized in
Tables 11 and 12.
Table 11 displays results very similar to the ones observed
for the whole sample of events in Table 7. The exception is
that the mean reaction for an announcement concerning an
existing product line has become less negative than it was for
the whole sample. Also, the mean value is no longer signif-
icantly different from zero on the 10 percent level. At the
same time, however, in this analysis the mean value for an-
nouncements concerning new products has increased drasti-
cally to 0.013 from the previous 0.004. This value is signifi-
cantly different from zero on the 5 percent level when mea-
sured with the student’s t-test. Finally, the sample means are
different from each other on the 5 percent significance level,
just like in the analysis for the whole sample. Overall, it can
be concluded that the increased legitimacy of the SaaS model
is reflected in the results. Investors seem to punish compa-
nies less for introducing SaaS for existing product lines and
reward introducing completely new SaaS product lines more.
At the same time, though, their relative valuation of intro-
ducing SaaS for new products instead of existing products
has not changed over time.
From Table 12 one can observe that the mean value of
CAR for announcements that imply no parallel offering has
increased slightly and reached the 10 percent significance
level. Otherwise, there are no notable changes to report com-
pared to the analysis for the full sample of events in Table 8.
Finally, I look at the same analysis for the partnering vari-
able. The results of the analysis are summarized in Table
13. One can observe that, compared to the analysis over the
whole sample, the mean values of the CARs for announce-
ments both with and without partnering have increased. As
a result, the student’s t-statistic for the mean CAR for an-
nouncements that imply a partnership is now significant at
the 5 percent level. At the same time, however, the signifi-
cance of the difference between the mean CARs for the two
sets of announcements has decreased, which would imply
that the importance of partnering for the delivery of a SaaS
offering reduces as markets become more familiar with the
model.
For added robustness, the univariate analyses were re-
peated by using the NASDAQ Composite index as the compar-
ison index for calculating the CARs. This led to no notable dif-
ferences in the results of the univariate analyses. To avoid the
limitations of a univariate analysis, multivariate analyses that
allow analyzing the simultaneous effects of multiple indepen-
dent variables on the dependent variable are performed. The
results of these analyses represent the main findings of this
study and they are presented in the next chapter. For the
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Table 10: Univariate analysis of mean CARs in different event types after 2006 (own illustration).
Event type N Mean SD Difference Corrado z-statistic
New product, no parallel offering 74 0.012* 0.052 1.433
New product, parallel offering 2 0.031 0.016 0.019 1.811†
Existing product, no parallel offering 12 -0.008 0.020 -0.021 -0.096
Existing product, parallel offering 14 -0.010 0.049 -0.023 -0.467
Notes: † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 (all tests are two-tailed). Difference shows the difference in mean to the first row. Corrado test statistic is calculated
using the complete event and estimation windows.
Table 11: Univariate analysis of mean CARs for existing and new product lines (own illustration).
Event type N Mean SD Difference Corrado z-statistic
Existing product 26 -0.009 0.038 -0.388
New product 76 0.013* 0.052 0.022* 1.635
Notes: † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 (all tests are two-tailed). Difference shows the difference in mean value to the first row. Corrado test statistic is
calculated using the complete event and estimation windows.
Table 12: Univariate analysis of mean CARs when a parallel perpetual offering is or is not implied (own illustration).
Event type N Mean SD Difference Corrado z-statistic
No parallel offering 86 0.010† 0.050 1.345
Parallel offering 14 -0.005 0.048 -0.015 0.130
Notes: † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 (all tests are two-tailed). Difference shows the difference in mean value to the first row. Corrado test statistic is
calculated using the complete event and estimation windows.
Table 13: Univariate analysis of mean CARs with and without a delivery partner after 2006 (own illustration).
Partnering choice N Mean SD Difference Corrado z-statistic
Without partnering 79 0.002 0.047 0.703
With partnering 23 0.024* 0.055 0.022† 1.619
Notes: † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 (all tests are two-tailed). Difference shows the difference in mean to the row above. Corrado test statistic is
calculated using the complete event and estimation windows.
multivariate analyses, robustness checks are performed and
reported in chapter 4.6.
4.5. Multivariate analyses
Because a multitude of potentially influential control vari-
ables have been identified, I begin with a model that includes
all of them to find out which ones are necessary to be in-
cluded in the final models. The results of this test are pre-
sented in Table 14.
The table shows that the combination of all control vari-
ables is relatively bad at explaining movements in the de-
pendent variable. In fact, only the control for early time has
a statistically significant effect on the CARs. By removing
the variables controlling for whether the company has done
SaaS before, the company’s SaaS experience, and whether
the company has been delisted since the announcement, the
model fit is increased considerably. The resulting baseline
model has explanatory value, meaning that a null hypothe-
sis stating that all coefficients are zero can be rejected with
95 percent confidence. Even though firm size and absorp-
tive capacity are not statistically significant in this model, I
include them in the further stages for two reasons. First, I
follow the example of previous event studies in the IT indus-
try (Alexy and George (2013); Oh et al. (2006)) to maintain
consistency and comparability in the methodology. Second,
the theoretical effects of firm size on legitimacy as well as
the effects of absorptive capacity on the ability to create new
business models and benefit from the subscription model are
J. Nurkka / Junior Management Science 3(2) (2018) 121-150142
Table 14: Initial multivariate regression test to identify necessary control variables (own illustration).
Independent variable All controls (OLS) Baseline (OLS)
Early time -0.054* (0.022) -0.055** (0.020)
Firm size -6.30e-8 (1.20e-7) -7.39e-8 (1.08e-7)
Absorptive capacity (R&D-to-sales ratio) -0.056 (0.064) -0.043 (0.061)
SaaS before -1.79e-4 (0.015)
SaaS experience / size 0.681 (0.715)
Delisted 0.008 (0.020)
Constant 0.015 (0.016) 0.016 (0.010)
Model fit 1.69 3.21*
Notes: † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 (all tests are two-tailed). N = 104 (reduced due to some companies not reporting their R&D expenses in annual
reports). Robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are reported in parentheses. Model fit is the f-statistic resulting from a Wald test with the hypothesis that
all coefficients equal to zero.
important and should be controlled for. Furthermore, addi-
tional robustness checks show that leaving the two control
variables out of the analyzed models has no significant effect
on the results.
Next, two models that incorporate the studied indepen-
dent variables to the baseline model are studied. The first
model adds the 3 independent variables on top of the base-
line model and performs an OLS regression. As the second
model, a two-stage Heckman regression model is employed.
In the first stage, the model predicts the existence of con-
founding events based on firm characteristics, and in the sec-
ond stage it uses the Inverse Mills ratio extracted from the
first stage to model potential bias caused by dropping con-
founded events from the sample. In both of the models, stan-
dard errors are clustered by firm. The coefficients generated
by the two models along with those of the baseline model are
summarized in Table 15.
The most immediate insight from the results of the two
regression models is that the studied three independent
variables have significant effects on the CARs. Based on
the coefficients, introducing a SaaS offering for an exist-
ing product reduces company value as compared to intro-
ducing it for a new product. At the same time, providing
a parallel perpetual offering and partnering with a cloud
platform/infrastructure provider increase company value as
opposed to not offering a parallel perpetual offering and not
partnering. All of the corresponding regression coefficients
are significant at least on the ten percent level in both mod-
els. In model 2, all coefficients are even significant on the five
percent level. Additionally, the Heckman model also seems to
have more explanatory power based on the higher F-statistic
value. Furthermore, the test of independent equations for
the Heckman model indicates that one can be confident that
a two-stage model is justified. Thus, model 2 is selected to
represent the main results of this study and the robustness
checks will be performed mainly on this model.
Interpreting the coefficients of model 2, one can make
three ceteris paribus statements about the influence of the
independent variables on the investors’ reaction to the intro-
duction of a new SaaS offering. First, the introduction of a
SaaS offering for an existing product leads to a drop in com-
pany value by 3.5 percent compared to an introduction of a
SaaS offering in the form of a new product launch. Second,
the notion of a parallel perpetual offering increases company
value by 2.2 percent compared to an introduction with no
mention of a parallel perpetual offering. Third, implying a
partnership with an infrastructure or platform provider leads
to an increase of 2.9 percent in company value compared to
an announcement with no mention of partnering. Because
all of these three coefficients are significant at least on the
5 percent level, the null hypotheses to the three hypotheses
presented in chapter 2.3 can be confirmed to have been fal-
sified. The hypotheses and findings of this study are summa-
rized side-by-side in Table 16.
The variables that control for the effects of firm size and
absorptive capacity have no statistically significant effect on
the dependent variable, just like in the baseline model. How-
ever, the control variable for early time has a highly signifi-
cant, highly negative effect on the CARs. Based on model 2,
if the announcement was made before 2006, it led to a ceteris
paribus decrease of 4.9 percent in company value compared
to if it was made from 2006 onwards.
In addition to the three models presented in Table 15, var-
ious other models were ran to measure interaction effects and
to ensure robustness of the results. First, the models 1 and
2 were extended with all possible interaction terms and with
individual dummies for each of the four different fields of the
2-by-2 of possible strategies presented in Figure 3. However,
the interaction terms were not statistically significant or did
not have enough observations to allow any conclusions to be
based on them. Using dummies for each of the four strate-
gies similarly proved difficult with the low amount of obser-
vations. Because the direction of the coefficients was always
the same on each side of the 2-by-2, it thus makes sense to
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Table 15: Coefficients resulting from multivariate regression models (own illustration).
Independent variable Baseline (OLS) Model 1 (OLS) Model 2 (Heckman)
Early time -0.055** (0.020) -0.054** (0.020) -0.049** (0.018)
Firm size -7.39e-8 (1.08e-7) -7.64e-8 (1.23e-7) 3.05e-7 (2.46e-7)
Absorptive capacity (R&D-to-sales ratio) -0.043 (0.061) -0.047 (0.051) -0.047 (0.048)
Existing product -0.032** (0.010) -0.035** (0.009)
Parallel offering 0.020† (0.012) 0.022* (0.011)
Partnering 0.029* (0.032) 0.029* (0.013)
Constant 0.016 (0.010) 0.015 (0.011) 0.058** (0.016)
Model fit 3.21* 3.42** 29.07**
F-statistic of independent equations 4.52*
Notes: † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 (all tests are two-tailed). N = 104 (reduced due to some companies not reporting their R&D expenses in annual
reports). Robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are reported in parentheses. Model fit is the f-statistic resulting from a Wald test with the hypothesis
that all coefficients equal to zero. F-statistic of independent equations results from a Wald test with the hypothesis that the first and second-stage model
of the Heckman model are independent. The Heckman model uses the following variables to predict the absence of confounding events: sales in million
USD (negative, significant), sales-per-employee (negative, insignificant), sales growth over past year (positive, insignificant), PPE (property, plants, and
equipment)-to-sales ratio (negative, insignificant).
Table 16: Comparison of hypothesized effects and the results of this study (own illustration).
Variable (Hypothesis) Hypothesized effect Finding
Existing product line (H1) - - (3.5 %)
Parallel perpetual offering (H2) + + (2.2 %)
Partnering (H3) + + (2.9 %)
Notes: The effects are comparison effect to the baseline value; for existing product line the baseline is new product introduction, for parallel perpetual offering
the baseline is no parallel perpetual offering and for partnering the baseline is no partnering.
report the results on the aggregate level.
4.6. Robustness checks
Because the event study methodology uses three differ-
ent parameters for calculating the abnormal returns for each
event, it is important to control for the robustness of the re-
sults by varying these parameters and repeating the multi-
variate regression with the resulting values of the dependent
variable. Just like in Table 2, where the mean values of the
dependent variable were analyzed over the whole sample, I
vary the comparison stock index, the event window and the
estimation window values and repeat the multivariate regres-
sion model 2 (Heckman) with the calculated CARs. Similarly
to Table 2 as well, the sample size increases for the mod-
els with a smaller event window as the window size for con-
founding events can be reduced. The different models for
robustness checks alongside model 2 are summarized in Ta-
ble 17.
The robustness checks yield two major points for discus-
sion. First, changing the event window length seems to dras-
tically reduce the explanatory power of the model. Models
IV and V barely hold explanatory power, and in neither of
the models are any of the coefficients for the independent
variables significantly different from zero. However, there
is a logical reasoning as to why this is the case. Many of
the announcements in the studied sample were made late
in the afternoon. Thus, including the trading day after the
announcement in the event window is crucial for a compre-
hensive representation of the market’s reaction, as shown in
chapter 4.1. The robustness checks display how the hypothe-
ses do not hold if the reaction of the trading day after the
announcement is not included. Even though studies have
shown that the initial reaction to new information can fol-
low within minutes, the focus of this study lies on the more
well- informed reaction to the new information.
Second, changing the comparison index and the esti-
mation window do not significantly change the coefficients.
When using the NASDAQ Composite index as the compari-
son index, the coefficients for the variables “existing product”
and “parallel offering” both slightly decrease, whereas the
coefficient for the variable partnering increases fractionally.
Regarding the significance levels, the significance of the
variable parallel offering decreases from 0.047 (5 percent
level) to 0.104 (just beyond the 10 percent level). Also, the
J. Nurkka / Junior Management Science 3(2) (2018) 121-150144
Table 17: Coefficients resulting from model 2 with various parameters for calculating CARs (own illustration).
Model (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Stock index S&P500 S&P500 NASDAQ S&P500 S&P500
Event window [-1,1] [-1,1] [-1,1] [-1,0] [0]
Estimation window 126 days 249 days 126 days 126 days 126 days
Uncensored obs. 104 104 104 113 137
Early time -0.049** (0.018) -0.046* (0.019) -0.049* (0.020) -0.025† (0.014) -0.009 (0.008)
Firm size 3.1e-7 (2.5e-7) 3.2e-07 (2.8e-7) 2.5e-07 (2.8e-7) 6.0e-08 (1.1e-7) -4.6e-08 (5.0e-8)
Absorptive capacity -0.047 (0.048) -0.047 (0.052) -0.042 (0.048) -0.060 (0.043) -0.013 (0.028)
Existing product -0.035** (0.009) -0.033** (0.009) -0.031** (0.009) -0.012 (0.010) -0.008 (0.006)
Parallel offering 0.022* (0.011) 0.024* (0.011) 0.018 (0.011) 0.007 (0.010) 0.011 (0.007)
Partnering 0.029* (0.013) 0.031* (0.013) 0.030* (0.012) 0.016 (0.011) -0.002 (0.005)
Constant 0.058** (0.016) 0.058** (0.018) 0.052* (0.021) 0.027† (0.015) -0.011 (0.010)
Model fit 29.07** 28.45** 27.59** 18.48** 3.03
F-statistic of indep. equations 4.52* 3.49† 1.97 1.15 1.56
Notes: † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 (all tests are two-tailed). Robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are reported in parentheses. Model fit is the
f-statistic resulting from a Wald test with the hypothesis that all coefficients equal to zero. F-statistic of independent equations results from a Wald test with
the hypothesis that the first and second-stage model of the Heckman model are independent. In models IV and V, the amount of uncensored observations is
bigger than in the other models as a smaller window for confounding events can be used due to a shorter event window.
F-statistic value of the Wald test of independent equations
(stage 1 and 2 of the Heckman model) drops to 1.97 in this
model, meaning that the Heckman selection model is no
longer necessarily justified. When using a 249-day estima-
tion window instead of a 126-day window, the only notable
change in the significance levels of the model is the reduced
significance of the Wald test of independent equations, which
drops to the 10 percent significance level.
Generally, the robustness checks increase confidence in
the results but they also raise some valid concerns and lim-
itations. On one hand, varying the estimation window does
not seem to influence the results, which is a good sign of ro-
bustness. On the other hand, changing the comparison index
from S&P500 to NASDAQ reduces the overall quality of the
results and especially raises doubts on the finding concern-
ing parallel perpetual offerings. The reason we have used
S&P500 in this study is because a bigger portion of the stud-
ied events are from companies in the NASDAQ Composite in-
dex than from companies in the S&P500 index. Besides, and
potentially because of that, using the S&P500 index seems to
generally lead to more robust results with the data. Addition-
ally, changing the event window length takes away any ex-
planatory value from the model. There is a logical argument
for including the trading day after the event in the measure-
ment of the CAR, which I have discussed in chapter 4.1, but
the fact that the model does not hold at all, if the day after the
event is not included, raises concerns. Previous studies have
looked into the stock market reactions on various days rela-
tive to an IT outsourcing event in detail (Oh et al. (2006)),
and I would propose such an analysis as a form of future re-
search for SaaS business models as well. Due to the increas-
ing number of confounding events when increasing the event
window length, this analysis was not possible with the data
available to this study and could not fit the scope of the study
due to the high workload of extending the sample.
To summarize, all three of the studied hypotheses have
been confirmed in this chapter. The robustness of the results
was studied, leading to some limitations and propositions for
future research. In the next chapter, the results are discussed
on a higher level, connecting them to existing research and
discussing what the implications are to both theory and prac-
tice.
5. Discussion
In this chapter I discuss the implications of the results
of this study for theory and practice along with the limita-
tions of this study and my proposals for future research. By
studying how stock markets react to software vendors’ an-
nouncements of new software as a service offerings, this the-
sis contributes to the academic discourse around the phe-
nomena of servitization. More specifically, it addresses the
business model transformation aspect of moving from selling
products to provisioning them as a service. The results can
progress understanding about what constitutes the servitiza-
tion paradox and how it can be managed when transforming
towards service-oriented business models where a product-
service system (PSS) replaces a product. Additionally, the
results of this study can help decision makers at companies
in and beyond the software industry understand how they
should approach the goal of servitization through PSS offer-
ings and how investors are likely to perceive their strategy of
transforming the business model.
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5.1. Implications for theory
A key part of the academic discourse around services are
the challenges related to transforming from a production-
oriented firm to a service provider. These arise both in
the general conversation about servitization (Baines et al.
(2009)) and in the more specific PSS field (Beuren et al.
(2013)). So far, academics have generated a well-rounded
understanding of what makes the transformation difficult
and how servitization as a firm-level phenomenon (mea-
sured in percentage of revenues from services) is reflected
in firm-level financial metrics (Gebauer et al. (2012)). Like-
wise, it is by far and large understood that provisioning
services entails strategic, financial and marketing benefits to
the provider (Baines et al. (2009); Mathieu (2001b); Oliva
and Kallenberg (2003)). However, studies have found that
the move from selling products to provisioning services de-
creases firm value and profitability - at least initially (Fang
et al. (2008); Suarez et al. (2013)). Due to this, the notion of
a servitization paradox (also referred to as service paradox)
has been coined by scholars (Gebauer et al. (2005); Neely
(2008)).
I argue in this thesis that the challenges of servitization
that cause the problems firms face when transforming from
selling products to provisioning service have to do with struc-
tural inertia (see Hannan and Freeman (1984)), both within
and beyond the provider’s organization. By looking at how
investors, who valuate stocks based on value-creation poten-
tial in the long-term, react to software vendors’ announce-
ments of new SaaS offerings, I have found indication that
inertia does get included in the valuations of investors when
companies transform their business model from traditional
product sales towards provisioning PSS. Additionally, I have
found that companies can manage the inertia by introducing
the PSS offering through new product lines and by offering
a traditional product sales model to customers in parallel.
Thus, the answer to the research question of this thesis is
that the transformation strategy and its implications on in-
ertia determine the value-creation potential of a new SaaS
offering from the perspective of investors.
The first finding of this study is that, on average, an in-
troduction of a PSS offering neither increases nor decreases
company value as perceived by investors. This means that,
per default, investors perceive the introduction of a PSS of-
fering as neither value-creating nor as value- destroying. This
indicates that, even if servitization has been shown to reduce
company profitability and valuations in the short-term (Fang
et al. (2008); Neely (2008); Suarez et al. (2013)), investors
believe and understand this to be a temporary phenomenon
that is caused by inertia related to the transformation pro-
cess. In other words, investors seem to think that there is
nothing inherently wrong with moving towards service pro-
visioning by offering products as a service. Thus, I would go
as far as to argue that the servitization paradox is not really
a paradox, but that servitization as a form of organizational
change simply has to overcome inertia.
This finding can support the argument for transforming
towards provisioning products as a service but it does not yet
provide guidance that companies could act on when execut-
ing the transformation. To that end, I argue in this study
that there are differences between strategies for introducing
a new PSS offering and that selection of a strategy influences
the inertia caused by the new business model and the op-
timization of resource-utilization in the value chain. More
specifically, companies can either provide the PSS model as
the sole business model or they can choose to offer a par-
allel model of traditional product sales. The former option
would mean that the company reduces the inertia associated
with the transition, as customers are provided a choice and
they would not have to change the way in which they acquire
products, provided they are used to purchasing the product
perpetually. At the same time, the company would be wast-
ing resources as many processes would have to be duplicated
to facilitate two inherently different business models for the
same product. In the latter option, the company can opti-
mize resource-utilization better, with the cost of additional
inertia associated with forcing customers to subscribe to a
PSS model. Additionally, companies can either introduce the
new PSS offering for existing product lines or by launching
completely new product lines. In the former case, the com-
pany would have to deal with additional inertia associated
with the installed base of customers and them potentially not
willing or being able to change the way they acquire the prod-
uct. However, with the latter option the company would not
be able to benefit from the installed base of customers and
product-related resources within the existing product line.
By studying the influence of these strategic choices on
the reaction of investors, I find that the challenges related to
servitization are apprehended by investors and that investors
seem to prefer minimizing inertia over optimizing the uti-
lization of resources. The results of my regression analyses
show that introductions of SaaS offerings for existing prod-
uct lines that imply no parallel offering lead to the least firm
value increase, whereas introductions of SaaS offerings for
new product lines that also imply a parallel perpetual offer-
ing lead to the most firm value increase. More specifically, an
introduction for a new product line increases firm value by
3.5 % as compared to an existing product line, and implica-
tion of a parallel perpetual offering increases company value
by 2.2 % as compared to no implication of a parallel offering.
This means that, despite the fact that existing product lines
can make use of existing resources and an installed base of
customers and that parallel business models lead to internal
competition and duplication of resources, investors seem to
believe that the inertia associated with pushing the organi-
zation and its customers to a service-based business model
induces too big a challenge.
Two additional interpretations can be made out of these
findings. Firstly, the finding on how parallel offerings are
preferred by investors over a clear focus on the SaaS model
sheds light on the role of PSS as product-replacing services
(Cusumano et al. (2015)). The finding can be interpreted in
a sense that investors do not believe that product sales should
be completely replaced by a service provisioning. Rather,
they seem to think that a PSS offering complements a tradi-
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tional product sales model. Another, less radical interpreta-
tion of the same finding is that investors are unsure about the
role of the SaaS model in the future and they believe compa-
nies should initially experiment on the model by offering it in
parallel to traditional product sales. What speaks for the for-
mer interpretation is that I have studied introductions over a
15-year period and controlled for the effects of time and com-
pany experience in the SaaS model. Initially, before 2006, the
average reaction to the introduction of SaaS offerings was
significantly more negative than it was after that point. Af-
ter controlling for this change in valuations, no indication
of a trend of increasing valuation of the SaaS model (over
time or by company experience) or an interaction between
time and parallel perpetual offerings could be observed in the
data. This indicates that the opinion of investors about the
role of PSS offerings is not changing. On the other hand, if
service-based business models were really not an alternative
to traditional product sales at least in some cases, one would
have to expect some pure SaaS software firms like Salesforce
to introduce traditional license sales models, which has not
been the case so far. Since this, at the time of writing this
thesis, seems unlikely to happen in the future, investors are
more likely uncertain about whether the PSS model can re-
place traditional product sales. There could also be variables
inherent to the product in question that define whether or
not a PSS model can create more value than a product sales
model. The existence and type of such variables could form
an interesting field for future research.
Secondly, the finding on how the firm value is influenced
by whether the PSS offering is introduced for a new prod-
uct line or an existing product line sheds new light on the
importance of customer adoption challenges related to servi-
tization. The discussion about the challenges of servitization
has so far focused mostly on change within the provider’s
organization (Baines et al. (2009)), and challenges related
to changing the organization of customers have not received
the attention they perhaps deserve. For example, taking over
processes like hosting and operating the software from cus-
tomers also means that the customers’ organizational struc-
tures become redundant. Besides organizational structures
and processes, customers might also be cognitively depen-
dent on acquiring the products via a perpetual purchase due
to learning effects (Sydow et al. (2009)). The results of this
study show a considerable negative effect on the investor re-
action to the announcement of a SaaS offering if the offer-
ing concerns an existing product as opposed to new prod-
ucts, regardless of whether or not a parallel perpetual offer-
ing is provided. As companies do not need to worry about
inertia or other inhibitors of change on existing customers’
side in the case of new products, this supports the argu-
ment that customer side inertia is of high importance in the
transformation process and possesses a great threat to value-
creation through a PSS offering. On the other hand, as cus-
tomers become more accustomed to acquiring products as
a service, PSS offerings become more important and attrac-
tive to providers. Based on this finding, qualitative analysis
into how customer path- dependence (Sydow et al. (2009))
can inhibit the introduction of PSS and other new business
models represents another interesting direction for future re-
search.
Furthermore, I discuss in this thesis that companies can
either work together with external service providers (e.g.
platform and infrastructure service providers like AWS, IBM
and Google in the software industry) to deliver the PSS of-
fering or they can choose to work alone, and that this choice
influences the value-creation potential of the firm. By exter-
nalizing certain aspects of the service delivery, the provider
can benefit from the economies of scale and innovation ca-
pabilities the third party can provide, meaning that resource-
utilization is optimized. Additionally, externalizing the deliv-
ery of new service capabilities would mean that the provider
does not have to transform its organization as much as it
would if it were to deliver all the new capabilities internally,
leading to less inertia. However, externalizing parts of the
service delivery also means that the provider has to take on
risks related to being dependent on an external party for
the delivery of their product and becoming dependent on
the selected provider. The results of this study indicate that
the benefits of outsourcing outweigh the potential risks. In-
vestors significantly increase (+2.9 %) their valuation of the
provider firm’s stock when the firm indicates that the new
SaaS offering is delivered in cooperation with a third-party
cloud platform and/or infrastructure service provider.
Besides these immediate findings, this study can con-
tribute to literature on category emergence and organiza-
tions as open systems. Firstly, theory on categories under-
stands that firms are evaluated by investors based on the
category they are perceived to belong to and what is seen
as legitimate for firms of that category (Zuckerman (1999)).
Alexy and George (2013) have shown that firms, when en-
tering the novel OSS (open source software) model that
diverges from what is considered legitimate for their cate-
gory, can influence the perception of their actions by blurring
the boundaries between categories. The results of my study
show that software vendors were initially punished with an
illegitimacy discount (Zuckerman (1999)) when they intro-
duced SaaS offerings. Thus, I have provided further proof of
the illegitimacy discount and shown that investors initially
considered the SaaS business model illegitimate for software
vendors. Additionally, the results of this study show that
the importance of partnering slightly decreases as the SaaS
model becomes more legitimate. This result could indicate
that in partnering with third party service providers for the
delivery of a novel business model, firms possess another
strategy for influencing the perceived legitimacy of their ac-
tions. Because the evidence provided by this study cannot be
considered conclusive on this, further studies into whether
and how partnerships can increase the perceived legitimacy
of divergent actions are called for.
Secondly, moving towards the PSS model and partner-
ing in its delivery can be interpreted on a high level as an
embodiment of organizations interacting more openly with
their environments (Scott and Davis (2015), pp. 87–106).
The PSS model is arguably different from outsourcing in that
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it implies a more fundamentally open interaction between
firms. In the SaaS model, which represents the implementa-
tion of PSS in the software industry, customer firms are not
simply outsourcing their IT systems and operations to a third
party, but they interact in a network of actors in close partner-
ships that combine capabilities for mutual benefit (Lee et al.
(2003)). Furthermore, the close partnerships imply that the
social perspective to cooperation becomes as important as the
economic and strategic perspectives, which is why the PSS
model should not be seen as a mere form of outsourcing (Lee
et al. (2003)). Because this study has shown that investors
believe the SaaS model to create long-term value (as long as
the inertia related to the change process is minimized), and
that investors value partnerships between the SaaS provider
and infrastructure and platform providers, the indication is
that a way of more open interaction of firms with their envi-
ronment is seen to be value-creating.
5.2. Managerial implications
The results of this study can also support the decision
making of practitioners in the software industry – potentially
even in other industries that are experiencing or will expe-
rience a transformation towards PSS offerings in the future.
Although it seems fairly clear by now that the SaaS model is
here to stay, many traditional software vendors are still strug-
gling with questions like when and how they should bring a
SaaS offering to the market. Many are also concerned about
how their investors might potentially react to the introduc-
tion.
This study finds that investors do not punish companies
for introducing a SaaS offering per-se. In fact, the results
show that an average announcement (after discounting for
initial illegitimacy discount by looking at events after 2005)
of a new SaaS offering increases company value provided it is
done through the introduction of a new product line. Conse-
quently, companies should seriously consider the SaaS model
when developing new product lines. However, it appears dif-
ficult to benefit from an installed base of customers for a
software product with the SaaS model, meaning that firms
are better off developing their SaaS offerings independently
of existing product lines, whenever possible. An example
of a company that understands the challenges is Dynatrace,
who set up a completely independent subsidiary (Dynatrace
Ruxit) to develop a line of new products with the SaaS model
with a view of re-integrating the subsidiary to the main busi-
ness later. More information on Dynatrace and other exam-
ples of SaaS transformations are provided in Appendix D.
At the same time, investors seem to believe that not all
customers of software vendors want to purchase the soft-
ware in the SaaS model, as the results show that investors
clearly favor approaches where the company explicitly offers
the software in the perpetual license sales model in parallel to
the SaaS model. Thus, companies should, at least temporar-
ily, provide customers with a choice in acquiring the software
either through the SaaS or perpetual licensing model.
Finally, the study indicates that investors perceive a bene-
fit in developing software on top of infrastructure and appli-
cation development platforms such as AWS, IBM or Google,
indicating that they are not as worried about dependency on
platforms as they are about not benefiting from the optimized
use of resources and access to innovation resulting from the
partnership. Consequently, companies should pursue coop-
eration in delivering their SaaS offering to customers.
5.3. Limitations and proposals for future research
As is inherent for event studies, the biggest limitation of
this study is that it can only draw on investors’ reactions to
publicly listed firms’ actions. In the software industry in par-
ticular, the model of provisioning software as a service was
initiated and first mastered by new firms like Salesforce and
Workday, who did not have to carry the burden of an es-
tablished business model. Yet with regards to transforming
a business from selling products to provisioning them as a
service, publicly listed firms form a representative sample of
firms that face the challenges related to the process. Fur-
thermore, I cannot think of an obvious reason as to why
the investors of non-listed firms should observe the inertia
and benefits associated with transforming towards PSS of-
ferings differently. Nevertheless, future studies into how in-
vestors of non-publicly listed firms have valued introductions
of PSS models could provide important insights into the phe-
nomenon from a different perspective.
Similarly, a limitation of all event studies is that they
draw on subjective perceptions of investors of publicly listed
firms. Even though the method draws on a large number
of investors’ perceptions and as such is statistically objective,
Zuckerman (1999) points out that non- conformance to cat-
egories as perceived by investors can be seen as illegitimate
and punished in valuations. In practice, this means that an-
alysts who decide how a vendor of pre-packaged software
should be valued might see SaaS offerings as illegitimate for
a pre-packaged software vendor. This could be reflected es-
pecially in the investors’ valuation of parallel perpetual of-
ferings. Consequently, future empirical analyses that draw
on longitudinal financial performance data of firms that have
introduced SaaS models with and without parallel perpetual
offerings could create important insights.
With regards to the results, it is interesting to observe
the strong influence of the length of the event window on
the regression models. The shorter the event window, the
more random the values of the CARs seem to become. Oh
et al. (2006), who previously reported the mean abnormal
returns in a similar study did not find as strong variance be-
tween the reactions on days 0 and +1 as I did. One rea-
son for the phenomenon could be an increase in algorithmic
trading (Hendershott et al. (2009)). Because the variance
between the 0 and +1 trading days was especially high for
events with a negative overall CAR, it could be possible that
investors were surprised by negative media reactions and
pressured to reduce their valuations eventually. Regardless,
future case studies should pay more attention to event win-
dow lengths. Furthermore, the influence of algorithmic trad-
ing on the whole method would represent an important field
for future research.
J. Nurkka / Junior Management Science 3(2) (2018) 121-150148
This study has explored new ground and opens up many
new questions worth exploring and answering through em-
pirical studies. The results indicate that the PSS model would
seldom completely replace selling products and that it would
rather act as an alternative targeted to customer segments
that would otherwise not be interested in purchasing the
product altogether. However, it could be insightful to study
whether this depends on product characteristics. For exam-
ple, could the level of standardization or some other product
characteristics play a role in whether the product will be pro-
visioned as a service for all customers? So far, no software
horizontal has completely moved to the SaaS model, but the
level of transition certainly differs between horizontals. For
example, CRM (Customer Resource Management) software
is largely dominated by the SaaS model today, whereas the
market for SCM (Supply Chain Management) SaaS applica-
tions is still tiny compared to its pre-packaged counterpart
(McGrath and Mahowald (2015)).
Furthermore, I have observed in my data how some com-
panies have temporarily used parallel business models to
manage the inertia of the business model transformation.
However, the length of the transition period has varied con-
siderably. Adobe Inc. only spent one year between introduc-
ing their SaaS offering for the Creative Suite product line and
announcing a halt in developing new versions of the perpet-
ual product. In contrast, Autodesk spent 15 years between
introducing their first SaaS model for desktop software and
halting all perpetual sales of products that are available in the
SaaS model. Studying how and why the transition periods
differ and comparing transitioned firms to the ones who are
still transitioning or not even looking to stop perpetual sales
could provide more qualitative insights on the phenomenon,
either supporting my empirical findings or questioning them.
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